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Abstract

Using liberal theory, this dissertation examines the behavior of member states in the
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), with a focus on middle powers. In particular, I
analyze whether trade between middle powers and Latin America and the Caribbean is
associated with an increase in middle powers’ subscription shares in the IADB. The analysis
draws on a cross-sectional time-series data set of capital subscription shares (in log form, and
first-differenced) for the period of 2004 to 2018. The results suggest that among all members of
the IADB, an increase in members’ trade with Latin America and the Caribbean was associated
with growth in capital subscription shares, on average, during the time-series. However, the
interaction term between middle powers and trade was negative and significant, which shows
that as middle powers’ trade with the region increased, the percentage point change in the log of
their capital subscriptions in the IADB declined. The results were robust to different methods for
coding middle power membership in the IADB. Additionally, voting affinity between IADB
members and the U.S. in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) was positive and
significant, suggesting the possible realist-based influence of the U.S. on other members of the
IADB, including middle power. Although the findings for trade among all members is consistent
with the expectation of liberal theory, the results for middle powers suggests that a more nuanced
process might be at work. Possibly, middle powers might reduce growth in their total amount of
capital subscriptions in the IADB because they view trade as a more effective than multilateral
aid at promoting mutual gains and poverty alleviation among states in the region. I also explore
other possible reasons for the unexpected finding for middle powers and trade. I offer my
responses against these supposed notions of structural realism throughout the dissertation.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Overview of RDBs
Regional development banks (RDBs) have become increasingly important in recent
history. Due to the rapid economic transformation in Eastern and Southeast Asia, the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) has deepened its activities within the region (Bull and Boas, 2003).
The ADB has pursued an independent role and focused the core of its attention on inclusive
growth and development. Poverty reduction and mitigating socioeconomic inequalities have
become the central themes of ADB policy. Further, the creation of a very influential department
known as the Office of Regional Economic Integration (OREI), located within the President’s
Office, has helped to guide ADB strategy (Kawai, 2005). Not only does the OREI contain an
abundance of professional and administrative staff, but its inclusion has raised the ADB’s
capacity to embrace regional cooperation and integration (RCI) matters in a most complex
manner. The new department’s vision is based upon four pillars of activity: regional and subregional economic cooperation programs on cross-border infrastructure, trade and investment
integration, monetary and financial integration, and cooperation in regional public goods (Dent,
2008). The anticipated expectation is twofold: to produce widespread security, and political,
and economic, cooperation between regional members (Rauniyar and Kanbur, 2010).
Similar to the ADB, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) has become more
involved in Latin America and the Caribbean. Initially, IADB spending policies were very much
1

orchestrated around social sector lending. This type of lending was most heavily geared toward
the region’s smaller and poorer countries (Nelson, 2000). Economic liberalization and
integration, however, would eventually assume dominant roles over the bank’s cultural norms.
Adopting a neoliberal agenda in its lending priorities, then, the IADB’s central aim became
focused on promoting market-oriented strategies in the attempt to avoid an economic repeat
(debt crisis associated with ISI) of the 1980s1 (Tussie, 1995). For the most part, these goals have
remained right on course. The IADB’s list of projects and annual reports help to illustrate this
point. With this being said, it is easy to see that the far majority of disbursements have been
invested in infrastructure and economic development (IADB, 2019).
Along with the initiative of fostering economic growth, the IADB has not completely
shunned all means for reducing poverty. The IADB’s emphasis on poverty reduction has
become particularly popular in the poorest countries (although it should be noted that Brazil and
Argentina, the two largest regional donors, are the biggest individual recipients of IADB aid) of
the region. They represent roughly a quarter of overall spending (Deruyttere, 1997; IADB,
2019). Despite efforts to improve the provision of education and the level of funding for
emergency crises across these most destitute member states, many gaps (social safety nets for the
unemployable poor and impact evaluation schemes) remain in place. The IADB, in turn, has
claimed that it is trying to better its position regarding socioeconomic inequality (Lustig and
Deutsch, 1998). Even in the post-Cold War era, it is argued that one of the IADB’s main goals

1

The word neoliberal is not to be confused with neoliberal institutionalism. A neoliberal agenda, in this case, is
referring to free-market policies (i.e. trade liberalization, financial liberalization, privatization, etc.) set forth by the
Washington Consensus. Because many Latin American states did not have onerously positive balance of payment
(BOP) accounts under import substitution industrialization (ISI), their economies were devastated at the onset of the
1980s debt crisis (see Tussie, 1995). For clarity purposes, anytime the word neoliberal is used by itself, it will
represent these tenets of free-market capitalism. By contrast, any mention of neoliberal institutionalism is done with
the intent to illustrate international relations (IR) theory.

2

has been to utilize such social sector investment via health and education in order to achieve
political and security cooperation. This strategy is in direct response to the growing influence of
emerging powers such as China and Russia within Latin America (Barria and Roper, 2004).
The recent pattern of lending amongst RDBs also highlights the ever-increasing social
and economic impact of these organizations. When considering the African Development Bank
(AfDB), for example, transport expenditures (which represent the largest share of the AfDB’s
spending portfolio) have already surpassed the bank’s total infrastructure budget for the entire
first decade (1967-1977) of AfDB existence. In fact, the cost of the most recent transport project
being done, known as Phase 2 of the Abidjan Urban Transport Project in Cote D’ Ivorie, exceeds
AfDB transport expenditures for the first decade alone by roughly $22 million (AfDB, 2018).
The IADB has also seen growth in its lending disbursements. For instance, in 2008, its
total loan approvals ($11.2 billion) represented a more than 11 percent increase over the amount
authorized in the previous year. In 2018, the IADB approved just under $14 billion worth of
sovereign guaranteed loan projects. As can be seen, this figure suggests an almost $3 billion
increase in total loan approvals over a mere decade. Throughout the first four decades (19602000) of its existence, the IADB approved only 12 projects that cost a net value of $500 million
or more. From 2001-2019, the number of projects increased to 77. Although some of these
ventures were subsequently cancelled, the fact remains that the IADB has either completed or is
in the process of completing many multi-million dollar projects (e.g. $1.25 and $1.5 billion
social investment programs in Colombia and Argentina) (IADB, 2019).
Few scholars would doubt the growing significance of RDBs, but the prior research
literature has tended to focus on the determinants of bank lending, and much of this literature
was grounded in a structural realist perspective. The IADB, for example, traces its roots back to
3

the 1950s. With the U.S. playing the leading role in Latin America, it was often assumed that the
IADB functioned to serve U.S. security interests by providing resources to buffer against the
spread of Communism during the Cold War (Retzl, 2015). Extending the realist notion, the
ADB – which was created in the 1960s - is often claimed to be dominated by two of its major
members, the U.S. and Japan. Although initially used as a bulwark against Communism in Asia,
the geopolitical stance of the ADB has not changed much in the post-Cold War era. The reason
behind the continuation of such realpolitik motives deals in specific relation to the emergence of
China and India as regional and potential global hegemons (Kilby, 2006).

Theoretical Roles of Middle Powers in RDBs
Although there is now a well-developed literature on the determinants of RDB lending,
there has been comparatively less attention given to other dimensions of bank governance. IR
scholars, for instance, have recognized the role of middle powers.2 It remains unclear, however,
why middle powers join RDBs. Perhaps more important, although many middle powers have
increased their subscription share of RDBs in recent years, the literature on this topic remains
scant. As a result, we know little about the motivations of middle powers in RDBs. In this

2

According to IR scholars, middle powers are recognizable by their foreign policy behavior. These authors look at
less constitutive features and more toward the proclivity of such states to engage in multilateral decision-making
regarding international problems (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 1993). Others focus on state capacity alone. This
term can be used to imply the extent at which a state realizes its own will (Holbraad, 1984). For some, the global
political economy is what ultimately determines middle power status. States that are positioned around the median
income level receive such classification (Cox and Sinclair, 1996). For the purpose of this dissertation, I amalgamate
all of these classifications into one working definition. This topic will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 4.
With such a definition in place, examples of middle power states consist of China, South Africa, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, and so forth.
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dissertation, I seek to fill this gap in the literature. In particular, I will examine why middle
power states increase (or decrease) their capital subscriptions in the RDBs to which they belong.
A study of changes in the capital shares of middle powers within RDBs can contribute to
theoretical debates in IR. In particular, the study has the potential to challenge the conventional
wisdom of previous literature, which has often proceeded from a structural realist perspective.
Prior scholarship has argued that middle powers are influenced by signaling, inducements, or
coercion of regional hegemonic powers within RDBs. However, if middle powers in RDBs are
not simply reacting to cues from regional hegemons, we may need to refine claims about the
dominance of hegemonic states within regional and international banks. This dissertation can
also contribute to recent theoretical debates about the rise of China, including China’s entry into
RDBs. A finding that middle powers and hegemonic states are cooperating in this area may also
imply that China’s recent entry in some RDBs will be smoother than anticipated. On a further
note, it is important to emphasize the practical or policy benefit of the study. Namely, it may
improve our understanding of governance in RDBs as a whole.

Liberal Argument and Explanations
My argument can be summarized in the following way. As overall trade increases
between middle powers and countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region, I expect
middle power states to increase their capital subscription shares in the IADB.3 Surprisingly, the

3

The definition of capital subscription shares can entail many different components. On one hand, for instance, the
word capital subscriptions might be used to refer to the total amount of weighted votes or percentage of weighted
votes that a member country possesses in an RDB, such as the IADB. For the purpose of this dissertation, however,
I turn to a simpler definition. Because capital subscription shares are directly reflective of actual foreign aid
commitments, I substitute them for multilateral assistance. This matter will be discussed more thoroughly in
Chapter 4.
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findings run contrary to my expectations. Middle powers’ subscription shares actually decline
when their level of trade goes up in Latin America and the Caribbean. The reason why I
hypothesize this to be the case, however, is that as middle power states’ economies become more
integrated within the region as a whole, they have more incentive to promote growth and
development as it is mutually beneficial for their economies and for the developing countries in
Latin America and the Caribbean. This level of economic betterment is significant for boosting
personal gain while reducing problems both at home and abroad.
Beyond trade, an increase in middle power activities in RDBs may indirectly promote the
activities of middle power firms across the region. With more regional and sub-regional
connectivity, multinational corporations (MNCs) from middle power states are given the
opportunity to invest in Latin America. The lending activities of RDBs can help to create a welleducated and functioning workforce in host economies, which is mutually beneficial to both
firms and the host economy. On the one hand, with a more educated workforce, multinational
firms can realize improvements in labor productivity and exports back to middle power
economies. On the other hand, workers in the host economy gain additional training and
managerial know-how from their employment. As ordinary citizens and firms seek to maximize
their own individual utility, such neoliberal-led development is believed to promote economic
development within the host economy.
As mentioned above, the external environment is also of utmost importance to middle
power states. For instance, while poverty reduction and lessening socioeconomic inequality
facilitate the standard of living for the entire populace, this activity appears to be of critical
importance in the developing world, where it has been associated with political violence. One
prominent example of such a claim in recent history is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
6

Colombia (FARC). An insurgent group premised on addressing high levels of inequality in
Colombia, the FARC presented itself as a very substantial fighting force that spanned over five
decades. Although FARC may be domestic in orientation and goals, formidable non-state
organizations or networks can also pose the potential threat of international terrorist activity.
It is for these reasons that I put forth a liberal argument. With state preferences being the
same, middle powers have strong incentives to try and maximize their own benefits and the
interests of developing states. Whether the benefits are economic, political, or social in nature,
the point is that they may desire outcomes which converge with those of the U.S. hegemon. The
behavior of middle power states across the IADB, and international organizations (IOs) in
general, thus may be driven by endogenous preferences of middle powers rather than coercion.
Moving forward, I proceed throughout this dissertation in the following manner.

Conclusion
Chapter II will encompass the literature review. It is here that I intend to discuss RDBs
and their specificities. The primary aspects that I aim to incorporate are a brief description of
some of the banks themselves (i.e. IADB, AfDB, and ADB) and previous theories explaining
their behavior. In particular, I think it important to understand how member states operate within
these banks and what motives or factors encourage them to vote in certain ways.
Chapter III will include the theory section. I use this chapter with the intent to offer a
more thorough explanation and detail about liberalism as a whole. Once I have given a fullfledged account of this theoretical approach, I plan to relay it to my argument at hand. It is in
this manner that I demonstrate how the liberal framework might possibly determine middle
7

power behavior within the IADB. Most importantly, perhaps, is that this description and
analysis be connected to a broader theme which consists of IO member states in general.
Chapter IV will entail data and methodology. This chapter is meant to highlight all
variables and the methodology. Additionally, the type of coding is depicted and explained in
further detail. I provide even more insight by stating why I selected these certain variables
(along with where they came from) and methodology. It is through this section that I seek to
derive the answer to my research question.
Chapter V will address the results and analysis section. It is here that each linear
regression model shall be displayed and explained. For each specific model, I intend to give a
full description at its own account. Using such statistically driven mechanisms and strategies, I
transition to an analytical discussion. After the results have been finalized, in other words, I put
forth my own interpretation. It is in this way that I can best describe the correlation between
intra/interregional trade and capital subscriptions.
Chapter VI will be strictly oriented around the conclusion. Once I have presented these
results and interpretations from my perspective, I will offer my final remarks. They shall look to
provide an immediate answer to the theoretical underpinning at hand and any current or future
policy implications that may be tied into this research agenda. With this being said, I intend to
show why liberalism may be more theoretically applicable (both within IOs and throughout the
international order) than structural realism.

8

Chapter 2

Theory and Literature Review

Introduction
Many different theoretical perspectives exist on why states behave the way they do in the
international order. Ranging from more rational choice based paradigms (i.e. realism, liberalism,
some forms of constructivism) to those that are postmodern (i.e. some forms of constructivism,
critical theory, and post-structural theory), cooperation and discord amongst states can be
explained using a wide array of theoretical frameworks. Given the empirical aims of this
dissertation, it seems best to merely focus on the theories that incorporate rational choice
precepts into their agenda. The postmodern theories, in other words, are not well suited for the
direction of this paper.
In addition to the general utility of IR theory alone, middle power states serve as the
primary unit of interest for the analysis. Rather than rely on hegemonic stability theory as a
universal predictor of international regimes, I use competing explanations to offer an account of
how it is often in the direct interest of middle power states to either conform to or revise the
status quo.4 It is their own choices, thus, that determine the outcome of international behavior.
Since this dissertation is primarily linked to the study of middle powers across the IADB, but yet

4

Status quo refers to the international regimes and rules set forth by a hegemon/s. In the contemporary world, the
status quo represents the U.S.’s neoliberal (Washington Consensus) agenda. Middle power and emerging states can
either accept (as they reap rewards via mutual gains) the status quo for what it is, or, they might aim to revise it with
their own systemic goals and policies (see Gilpin, 1987).
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includes other lesser power states into the analysis, I find it pertinent to both isolate and relate
their actions across IOs as a whole. I proceed into this chapter by initially discussing the
rationalist based theoretical perspectives on international regimes and cooperation before moving
into how they apply to middle powers in IOs and, more specifically, to states in RDBs.

Structural Realism
Traditional realists view international regimes as epiphenomenal (Carr, 1939). That
being said, these scholars actually observe the presence of formal organizations (UN, IMF, WB,
WTO) and informal arrangements. Their claims are simple. Any cooperation that takes place
amongst participant members is superficial (Gruber, 2000). Hegemons are solely responsible for
setting the agenda and lesser powers will abide by superior demands with or without the
enactment of institutions. Current regimes, in other words, only serve as by-products for U.S.
grand strategy (Charrette and Sterling-Folker, 2018). This phenomenon is often referred to as
structural power. Although the U.S. may have lost some of its relative power over the last few
decades (as a result of the rise of the European Union (EU), Japan, China, and other emerging
powers), it has continued to maintain the world order, which is economically neoliberal
(Strange, 1987).
While most contemporary realists agree with this stance, it is only to a certain degree.
For instance, while many believe that international regimes are highly irrelevant in matters of
security, others claim this is not so much the case with regard to economics (Keohane, 1984). In
the former sense, regimes are nothing more than intervening variables between power and
cooperation. This reality helps explain why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has

10

expanded and still exists despite many of its members not meeting their financial obligations.
The U.S., basically, has allowed these countries to renege on their duties for the purpose of
maintaining a widespread security alliance (Mearsheimer, 1994). From an economic
perspective, however, regimes actually provide substance by serving as informational guidelines
among participant members. It is argued that such functions help to explain the longevity of
institutions such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which evolved into the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. On this view, thus, cooperation is not due to U.S.
hegemony, and the U.S. cannot force other countries into compliance. Rather, the existence of
cooperation stems from state preferences that reflect their imminent and long-term national
interests as much as U.S. interests (Krasner, 1982).

Liberal and Neoliberal Perspectives
Moving away from realism, liberals see international regimes as indicative of state
preferences. At the domestic level, different actors (including transnational firms) compete
against one another in hope of obtaining political outcomes that meet their interests (Moravcsik,
1997). When these preferences or interests are parallel across states, regimes tend to emerge.
International regimes, thus, happen to appear in a variety of ways (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999).
For instance, one might look at regional regimes on fisheries and licensing agreements for deep
seabed mining as notable examples here. It is said that if these arrangements are not set in place,
national firms will overuse the resources at hand. The long-term interests of firms, then, become
jeopardized as prices decrease from surplus production and as natural resources are depleted or
inch near extinction (leading to a situation where all firms are worse off) (Young, 1989).

11

As noted above, regimes may also emerge as a direct result of transnational influences on
domestic governance (Litfin, 1994). In the era of globalization, this pattern has become
particularly popular relative to epistemic communities. Since these latter entities tend to be
composed of specialized and professional bureaucrats, states often absorb their knowledge and,
therefore, convert this information into preferences (Hopkins, 1992). Sufficient evidence of such
a claim is portrayed via the Mediterranean Plan. A cohort of knowledgeable ecologists
(epistemic community) asserted their environmental concerns (declining ecosystem, increased
pollution, and minimization of the dolphin population) onto policymakers within the participant
states. These latter existences responded by adopting the Plan with the intent to reduce such
ecological problems through their obedience to the regime (Haas, 1989).
Further insight has been placed onto this matter. Epistemic communities are also
believed to exist amongst neoclassical economists (Kapstein, 1992). As they adapt and learn
new information, such messages are relayed to hegemonic states. Once other member states
consume this knowledge, they integrate it into policy-making across their respected international
organization/s (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990). The World Bank is used as an example here.
When the Marshall Plan went into effect in 1947, the original purpose (providing loans to
Western Europe) of the World Bank was no longer relevant. Professional staff members
responded by persuading its leading governments (U.S. and Great Britain) that poverty reduction
goals needed to be implemented throughout the developing world. These Western powers
followed such requests and made Third World poverty reduction into a regime (Haas, 1990).
Another form of non-conflictual liberal cooperation exists between democratic and
autocratic governments. On one account, it is noted how both forms of government share the
same preferences when considering certain economic issue areas (Hankla and Kuthy, 2013). An
12

additional example of this reality might be located within the environmental (climate change)
realm. Although signatory countries to multilateral agreements like Kyoto Protocol and the Paris
Agreement have set their target goals (which often have not been met) at different levels, they,
nonetheless, seemingly demonstrate why addressing such universal issues are more important
than governmental regime types alone. Despite such ideological differences that exist in other
(governmental regime type and human rights) issue areas, democracies and autocracies, in this
sense, strive to reach some sort of environmental cooperation with one another (Held, 2010).
Transitioning from liberalism to neoliberal institutionalism, some important points of
departure deserve notice. Under the latter theory, there are multiple channels of independent
actors (states, firms, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), IOs, etc.). Neoliberal
institutionalists, in other words, believe that non-state beings are not required to behave through
the state alone (Keohane and Nye, 1977). These former entities are as equally motivated by
rational outcomes and utility gains. Given that all types of global actors often reap similar
benefits from mutually inclusive (whether this be economic, political, or security)
interdependence, international regimes are created to offer them some kind of substance
(Axelrod and Keohane, 1984). As interactions are iterated over time in what becomes known as
a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game, transaction costs are lowered and information becomes overly
abundant. Levels of expectation, thus, can now be anticipated amongst each participating
member (Axelrod, 1984). The emergence of GATT (although now replaced by the WTO) is
used to illustrate an example here. Since member states believed that they would all benefit
(absolute gains) from such an arrangement, the rational approach was to fully embrace
themselves with this hegemonic creation. GATT, therefore, served as a legitimate and noncoercive international trade regime (Keohane, 1984).
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While not digressing too much from these analyses, some further light can be shed onto
this matter. Although different actors may indeed share certain interests, they are also likely to
defect when the size of the group becomes too large (Olson, 1965). Larger N-groups, in other
words, are more apt to defect because they possess the option to free-ride. As additional players
enter the contest, it becomes much harder and costly for states to detect and punish defection
(Oye, 1985). When numbers cannot be reduced, however, the most efficient strategy appears to
be promoting cooperation through international regimes. Well-established rules and collective
enforcement of violated principles offer some form of guidance and response mechanisms
(Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 1996). There is evidence at hand to support the crux of
such an argument. For instance, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has well beyond
100 active members. Initially, this body had little enforcement power and, therefore, was
ineffective in its punishment against oil discharge violators. As it suddenly changed its stance
and transitioned to the implementation of potent sanctions (license removal and port detainment
for equipment regime violations), participant members became much more compliant (Downs,
Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996).
According to other neoliberal institutionalists, group size and enforcement mechanisms
alone cannot determine compliance with international regimes. They allude to the significance
that underlies the nature of a game and its potential costs (Schwarzer, 1998). Specific mention is
made of suasion tactics and the formulation of sanctioning regimes. While some states may
agree regarding action (sanctions) that ought to be taken against other states, they would rather
let their allies pursue such action as it could be detrimental to their own economic interests. On
the other hand, although a leading power would like to see its allies supplementing such action
(sanctions), it, nevertheless, may decide to act alone as non-sanctioning could produce severe
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(threat to security) consequences. To further enhance the chances of cooperation amongst other
actors, then, this central sanctioning state must find a way to commit itself. It can do so through
raising audience costs (Martin, 1993). As the dominant actor is able to garner profound
coalitional support at the domestic level, the political costs of reneging (as the central state can
impose countersanctions on its allies) multiply by a significant amount. This means that it
becomes very costly for the international counterpart to restrain from upholding the regime. If
the situation is vice-versa, and no widespread consensus seems to be present, then the costs of
reneging (primary sanction state) and noncompliance (other state) are much lower (Zurn, 1992).
The effectiveness of international regimes, thus, are not solely dependent on numbers and
enforcement. In this case, the cost-benefit analyses of each participant member holds greatest
weight (Noehrenberg, 1995).
Similar, yet distinct comparisons can be made against the nature of such sanctioning
regimes when placing competing outlooks into perspective. Other neoliberal institutionalists,
indeed, agree that group size and enforcement power only matter so much for compliance
(Lipson, 1984). The divergence between them and those mentioned above, however, stems from
the type of cost-benefit calculations at hand. Whereas the preceding institutionalists present an
image that produces various (sometimes compliance and sometimes not pending the audience
costs) results, these alternate claims suggest that uniformity in behavior and more stable regimes
are possible (Zangl, 1994). Compliance with the international monetary regime is listed as a
notable example here. Such cooperation might best be explained by market pressure rather than
centralized forces (such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)) alone. Member countries, in
other words, are willing to oblige themselves to this particular institutional arrangement. This
strategy is believed to enhance their overall economic well-being in the face of an ever-growing
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interdependent world. Restrictive violations (i.e. capital controls or a fixed exchange rate)
merely serve to damage one’s reputation. It can be said, then, that member countries submit to
the IMF’s Articles of Agreement under their own discretion. An international monetary regime,
therefore, exists across all relevant actors without the need of coercion and independent from
group size (Simmons, 2000).
For other neoliberal institutionalists, international regimes only matter so much as actors’
rational goals continue to be met. If the status quo of a regime, in other words, is no longer
suitable to preferred outcomes, actors will more than likely abandon or defect from them (Stein,
1983). Resorting to IOs, it has been argued that whenever the UN Security Council (UNSC)
enacts decisions (whether it be through resolutions or vetoes) that counter the U.S. position, the
latter entity purposefully violates its Chapter VII obligations in order to promote its individual
interests. By contrast, some institutionalists see IOs as instigators of regimes. They claim that
the international human rights regime came into fruition because of state interaction within IOs.
Once this foundation was set, crises reactions (as they allude to NATO intervention in former
Yugoslavia) could be anticipated amongst the participant members (Abbott and Snidal, 1998).

Constructivism
According to constructivists, international regimes are a product of social interaction
processes (Hopf, 1998). With that being said, the many different actors (states, firms, NGOs,
IOs) that constitute the global system are ultimately responsible for determining regime
formation. As ideas are disseminated through personal or collective engagement, interests
become mutual (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001). Such interests, then, take the shape of what
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receives acceptance as commonly understood and valued norms. Since norms cannot be fixed
and often change with new interactive exchanges over time, international regimes may fluctuate
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). It is for this exact reason that the concept of anarchy must not
be limited to a pure materialist interpretation. Due to their ability to self-reflect, various
international actors are bound to adjust status quo viewpoints in favor of newer intersubjective
meaning. Regimes, in this sense, might pursue a multitude of lifeforms or existences throughout
the course of history (Wendt, 1999).
Not digressing too far from this theoretical agenda, other constructivists offer some
additional light. They categorize this type of behavior as something known as “speech acts”
(Duffy and Frederking, 2009). This terminology simply indicates what actors might be able to
expect of each other’s behavior without actually being influenced into an identity shift. If
preferences are the same, then actors will either verbally or legally (via treaty) assert themselves
in accordance to some predictable sort of outcome (Kratochwil, 1991). Although not in
complete discord with this prior assumption, an extra element can be inserted into the “speech
acts” equation. It is claimed that “speech acts” can also provide a net distributional benefit to
each participating member. By living up to their declared commitments, in other words, actors
will reap the imminent rewards of cooperation and, therefore, grant international regimes full
legitimacy (Onuf, 2012).
Some constructivists are notable for discussing how international regimes manifest
amongst different actors (Klotz, 1995). On one hand, this notion is divulged through the state. It
is said that as many Western countries witnessed a socially constructed transition from warfare to
welfare state, they began to develop humanitarian identities. National security, thus, could now
be premised on human rights regimes instead of competitive materialism. In fact, it is this type
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of constructivist wisdom that explains why the Western states (via UN resolutions and NATO)
led two expeditions into former Yugoslavia (Katzenstein, 1996). Although the same principle,
other constructivists focus more toward economic (monetary and trade) regimes. The stated
ideal of embedded liberalism (free market capitalism with capital controls, adjustable fixed pegs,
trade restrictions, and other forms of opportunistic government intervention) was a socially
created phenomenon between Western states resulting from welfare ideologies and similar
historical (Great Depression) experience. Certain scholars have claimed that these latter ideals
are what caused Western states to prop up post-World War II economic institutions (IMF, WB,
and GATT) founded in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire (Ruggie, 1982).
In addition to states, constructivists have also investigated regime formation at the IO
level (Jupille, Caporaso, and Checkel, 2003). For instance, some point at how environmental
regimes developed within the World Bank. They say that the advocacy of transnational
networks and NGOs induced the organization to adopt an Inspection Panel. It would (at least
supposedly) be used as an accountability mechanism to ascertain that Bank funded projects do
not contribute to environmental hazards and degradation (Park, 2005). Complementing this
analysis, others have inspected transparency regimes across different IOs. It is argued that while
transparency regimes do not exist in some entities, they do in others. The logic is simple. Since
certain organizations (such as NATO and the EU) consist of member states that have diverging
interests on transparency matters, no accord and, therefore, regime can be formulated. By
contrast, because an IO such as the Council of Europe (C of E) does, indeed, embed Freedom of
Information (FOI) laws into its constitution it helps to establish and legitimize transparency as a
regime (Grigorescu, 2002).

18

Theoretical Explanations on Middle Power Behavior in IOs
Having reviewed the general theoretical perspectives, I turn now to a discussion of the
research literature that is specific to middle powers and IOs. One explanation as to why middle
power or emerging states join IOs is for the purpose of balancing (Krasner, 1985). According to
this view, middle powers aim to reap the economic benefits of such multilateral aid
disbursements. Be it through trade or investment, middle powers can use their resources to forge
political alliances with one another (Pape, 2005). This strategy provides a means to enhance
security against the relative power of a global hegemon. Cooperation, thus, serves as nothing
more than a path for promoting the self-interest (an economically and politically induced security
agenda) of these middle power states (Waltz, 2000).
Expanding upon this realist notion, it is said that emerging powers enter into IOs due to
the spoiler effect. Such states, in other words, have the opportunity to act as free riders (Lake,
1983). Due to the overbearing costs (whether it be financial or transaction) of maintaining world
order, hegemons are placed at a relative disadvantage against their middle power counterparts.
While the former entities are compelled to invest ample time and resources into upholding global
stability, emerging states utilize their ever-increasing economic base to foster domestic growth
(Jervis, 1982). As middle power states reach a point of ascent, they can begin to apply pressure
and, thus, challenge the international order. Ultimately, they look to change the status quo more
in line with their own particular interests (Gilpin, 1987).
Another theoretical perspective dealing with middle power behavior across IOs is the
notion of cooptation. More aligned with neoliberal institutionalist theory, cooptation goes handin-hand with the idea of authentic cooperation (Hurrell, 2006). Hegemons, for example,
integrate rising challengers into prestigious IO roles at the behest of maintaining the status quo
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(liberal world order). Being that such emerging countries reap many of the same rewards
(economic growth) as do ruling hegemons from this liberal world order, they have no incentive
to change it. Middle power states, in other words, are engaged in an international sphere of
absolute gains and, therefore, have very similar interests to those of their hegemonic counterparts
(Keohane, 2002). It is in this sense that such emerging states are likely to cooperate with
hegemons. Instead of attempting to balance against greater powers or acting as revisionary
states, middle power states aim to further their own prospects by maximizing utility in IOs
(Ikenberry and Wright, 2008).
Further highlighting this institutionalist conviction, it is said that middle powers act as
compromisers in IOs. By appeasing the demands of hegemons, these states garner a favorable
reputation (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 1993). They are, then, able to assume more influence
(using political alliances and their coherent institutional loyalty) and exert momentous pressure
onto the status quo. Being that middle powers are primarily committed to an established world
order and do not want to risk jeopardizing their international status or legitimacy, they strictly
seek to enact an insignificant dose of revisionary change (Keohane, 1969). The problem with
this strategy, however, is that extolling any kind of institutional revisionism can ultimately lead
to a weakening and potential demise of the status quo altogether. An emerging power such as
Brazil provides a concrete example. Given that it has abounded by the Western “rules” of the
game, Brazil has developed a likeable identity and become well-respected across the global
arena. Even more important, perhaps, is that this emerging power has gained much utility
(economic, political, security) under the neoliberal umbrella. It would, thus, be foolish for Brazil
to abandon its more grandeur interests in pursuit of less significant alterations (Lopes, Casaroes,
and Gama, 2013).
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The neoliberal institutionalist framework also provides much explanatory substance aside
from cooptation. For instance, middle powers rely on rules and institutions to help lower
transaction costs, create information, and develop a tide of expectations (Martin, 1992). These
structural enhancement type mechanisms, in turn, offer middle power states an easy and
predictable avenue for forwarding their interests. From this angle, it can be said that emerging or
middle power states do not merely use IOs as a means of cooptation. Rather than attempt to
implement any revisionary (via legitimacy and dependability) role, middle power behavior is
premised more on upholding the status quo. Since they are the systemic beneficiaries of such an
order, these states have no genuine incentive to change it (Ikenberry, 2008). A notable example
here is China. As this emerging power has largely (both economically and politically) gained
from its inclusion in the Western-centered international system, IOs only serve to facilitate the
Chinese position. China, in other words, seeks to continue maximizing its utility by living
accordingly with robust and coherent IO rule-based agendas (Zheng and Zhang, 2012).
Not digressing too much from neoliberal institutionalism, the liberal approach explains
IO affiliation as being based on preference (i.e. Japanese pursuit of preferred whaling policies via
vote-buying in the International Whaling Commission (IWC)) enhancement (Strand and Tuman,
2012). Middle powers, thus, seek to promote their own individual interests (mutual gains) by
distributing resources to IOs that fulfill stately obligations (Lim and Vreeland, 2013). This
supposed reality seems to be particularly true when considering the advent of the BRICS-led
New Development Bank (NDB). Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa suggested the
NDB’s formation in order to better their infrastructural investment prospects. Due to such a
large gap (stemming from higher industrialization and demand) in development financing, these
emerging powers see the NDB as a tool to forward national interests like infrastructure spending
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and economic growth (Chin, 2014). A very similar dynamic can be used to highlight the
extended network of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) middle power states. For
instance, New Zealand, Australia, South Korea, and ample EU countries have joined the AIIB
despite U.S. opposition. As these Western entities look to become more economically engaged
with China and the Asian region in general, AIIB membership offers an avenue for furthering
state preferences (Callaghan and Hubbard, 2016).
The liberal approach can also be understood in terms of internationalism. With that being
said, middle power states invest their resources in IOs with the intent to advance a multilateral
world order (Rudderham, 2008). Since they do not possess the required hard power or material
capacity, middle powers resort to IOs in pursuit of establishing global ideals. Individual state
preferences, of course, still matter. When these interests become well-aligned (as is often
anticipated with traditional middle powers) across IO settings, though, they are expected to take
on a more internationalist (rather than nationalist) role (Matthew, 2003). Japan, Canada,
Australia, and the Netherlands serve as classic examples in this regard. Each of these middle
power states have actively engaged in the Ottawa Process to ban anti-personnel landmines, the
comprehensive test ban regime, the chemical weapons convention, and the UN Conference on
Disarmament (Colijn, 2004).
From a constructivist perspective, it can be said that middle or emerging powers use IOs
as a way to promote their interests through social interaction (Nye, 2004). Being that many of
these states are committed to the neoliberal world order, there is no need to disrupt this status
quo by pursuing hardline military tactics. Instead, middle power states seek to achieve their
revisionary goals through the imposition (via iterated social engagements) of soft influence (Li
and Worm, 2011). In fact, a rising middle power like Turkey has attempted to follow such an
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overarching aim. With global governance issues (most notably humanitarian crises) that
immediately impact it on the ascent, Turkey plans to reach its desired political outcomes by
channeling persuasive dialogue and strategically utilizing its long-term membership across
hegemonic-led IOs (Dal and Gok, 2014).
Another constructivist angle focuses on the initial willpower of middle powers to dilute
hegemonic influence. Without the formation and presence of IOs, in other words, the likelihood
of the U.S. or Great Britain imprinting middle power states with their own foreign policy ideals
becomes much higher. This phenomenon is especially true in the case of Canada. Using the UN
umbrella (Western-led IOs) as a diversionary tactic, Canada has been able to ward off any valuebased leverage that does not conform to its own (Fox, 1996). Once it mitigated the adoptive
opportunity or essentially rid itself of such unwanted interests, Canada transitioned into a norm
entrepreneur and diffuser. Aside from more general human security (ban on land mines, controls
on small arms proliferation and child soldiers, eliminating gender inequality) issues, this middle
power was a critical advocate for supporting and creating the International Criminal Court (ICC).
The fact that the U.S. is not a state party to this IO sheds even further light when regarding the
norm-led significance of middle powers like Canada (Howard and Neufeldt, 2000).
The constructivist approach is most suitable for explaining middle power behavior from a
nuanced ideational standpoint. What this means, basically, is that middle power states premise
their IO actions on self-identity or perception (Wendt, 1994). When these states quit believing
(whether this be motivated by their own lack of willpower/interests or reactionary to the loss of
status imposed upon them) that they elicit any type of critical meaning in IO decision-making
procedures, a social deconstruction process emerges. Consequently, these particular middle
powers are likely to perform limited niches in their current IOs and become dissuaded in joining
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future IOs. The same can be said the other way around. As middle power states have their
international statuses boosted and legitimized, they socially reconstruct themselves into more
pragmatically engaged role players (Schimmelfennig, 2003). A notable example of such claims
is Canada and Australia in the Asia-Pacific region. Since the former state has been politically
marginalized (due to a failed bid to the UNSC and lack of invitations to the East Asia Summit
(EAS) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers Meeting
(ADMM)) at both the international and regional level, it no longer identifies or, therefore,
attempts to serve as an essential body within the Asia-Pacific IO context. Australia, on the other
hand, being wholly integrated into the EAS and ADMM spheres of influence, has reshaped its
meaning of middle power. It, thus, has assumed a more proactive stance across the Asia-Pacific
realm (Bezglasnyy, 2013).

Theoretical Literature on RDBs
Aside from the previously aforementioned literature, other realist-based studies have
hinted at U.S. dominance within the organization with respect to internal voting dynamics. For
instance, the voting structure of the IADB is based on a weighted system. Since the U.S.
occupies roughly 30 percent of votes, it is deemed to hold a significant amount of decisionmaking power (DeWitt, 1987). This argument has been furthered by investigating the effects of
relative voting power. It has been declared, in other words, that U.S. leverage is not so much a
product of its voting weight, but rather its ability to substantively determine the outcomes of
coalition alignment (Strand, 2003).
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Piggybacking onto the abovementioned realist perspectives, it is worth noting that the
U.S. holds effective veto power over certain policy (i.e. constitutional amendments) decisions.
In respect to its vast shareholder status, this reality is particularly true in the IADB. It can be
assumed that the U.S. has exerted an excessive amount of leverage over the steady capital
accumulation procedures and subsequent funding conditions that have taken place in response
(being there a higher borrowing member country (BMC) demand for developmental assistance)
to the 2008-2009 global financial crisis (Nelson, 2011). As the U.S. Congress controls the power
of the purse, it wields high authority in ascertaining that RDB decision-making meets its own
criteria. Due to the fact that local constituents have minimal (if any) knowledge or concern
about international financial institutions (IFIs) as a whole, congressional interests tend to be
shaped by pluralist (civil society) groups. Since the U.S. exercises such considerable influence
within most RDBs, it is able to sway member states into adopting many of these preferred
policies (Babb, 2009).
Using a liberal framework, the most central objective, perhaps, is to look at the
institutional design and incentive structure of RDBs. If the governance model delegates any kind
of consequential authority to member states, then it can be said that power (although
disproportionate) is shared (Gutner, 2002). On this note, it is worth mentioning that the majority
of IADB ownership is possessed by Latin American BMCs. These BMCs, in other words, are
also integral to the overall lending process. In fact, the U.S. has been shown to demonstrate
insignificant informal influence over other member states (Bland and Kilby, 2015). IADB social
lending has increased dramatically as domestic and bilateral social expenditures amongst
industrialized states (U.S. and EU) have remained stagnant. Without coalitional consensus,
financial packages cannot be delivered to recipient states. It must be assumed, then, that lending
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decisions are not only a mere reflection of hegemonic or great power interests, but lesser power
preferences (whether they be economic, political, security, or ideological) as well (Lyne, Nielson
and Tierney, 2009).
Other research has pointed out the core assumptions that can be made from scrutinizing
such an institutional context. It has been suggested, for example, that the U.S., Japan, and
dictatorial rulers (i.e. Indonesia, China, Germany, etc.) of syndicates (coalitional blocs) possess
all formal voting power within the ADB. The fact that lesser powers continue to commit
themselves to such dominance and heighten their lack of prestige suggests that they must be
receiving some sort of preferential outcome (Strand, 1999). Furthering this argument even more,
it is not denied that the U.S. has utilized its weighted position in order to achieve economic
(along with security and political) interests within the Asian region. Of equal importance,
however, is the notion that middle power states such as Japan and Australia have also used their
own relative power in the ADB to better economic prospects. Multilateralism, thus, serves as a
channel for fostering both hegemonic and emerging preferences alike (Dutt, 1997).
Adding to the liberal perspective, researchers have extended their investigation into what
types of state preferences motivate RDB lending behavior. Of course, differences (i.e. the AfDB
being much more committed to poverty alleviation than ADB) are bound to exist across each
RDB. It can be noted, however, that the main commonality is sustainable development via
regional integration (Culpeper, 1994). For instance, it is argued that the ADB provides more
environmentally risky aid to countries with better past performance standards. This reality does
not imply that recipients with low results absorb fewer overall disbursements. By contrast, they
actually receive more non-risk funding (Buntaine, 2011). To better this argument, other scholars
have utilized econometric analyses and statistical data. Within the IADB, green expenditures
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represented a mere 23% of overall spending from 2007-2016. Although shareholder countries
that exhibit sufficient environmental performance appear to receive the highest amount of green
allocation over time, it is still not enough to fill a significant gap in this area. While these
findings do reveal the intensified nature of strict economic development measures, the fact that
almost one-fourth of IADB output goes toward the environment indicates that at least some
member states have fairly robust green/climate interests (Yuan and Gallagher, 2018).
Looking at state preferences from a purely economic standpoint, it is claimed that RDBs
spend more on less populous and wealthy countries. With the exception of the IADB (which
places ample emphasis on social sector spending), the aim of RDB disbursements is to foster
economic growth via vast infrastructure investment in these less fortunate states (Neumayer,
2003). On the other hand, it is argued that state preferences may actually lay with increasing the
development of newly industrialized countries (NICs). As such middle-income states seek to
promote their economic advancement, they require heavier financial commitments in lesser
developed areas. Poorer segments of these NICs, in other words, are just as (if not more) needy
than more impoverished countries as a whole (Birdsall, Vanzetti, and de Cordoba, 2006).
The liberal notion of state preferences might be taken even one step closer when
considering primary RDB objectives. For instance, within the IADB it is stated that contingent
valuation (CV), a type of cost-benefit economic approach, is most efficient for promoting
environmental enhancement amongst member states in general. While improving environmental
conditions is important, this can only matter so much as projects reap debt-efficient type rewards
(Ardila, Quiroga, and Vaughan, 1998). Further, it is claimed that the more powerful member
states advocate spending on projects where they (wealthier countries) are most likely to get
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repaid. Since this supposed reality serves as a causal mechanism for lending, state interests are
linked to bank profiteering rather than acting as development agencies (Ben-Artzi, 2016).
In terms of the constructivist approach, not only have the IADB and ADB socially
interacted with or made verbal commitments to improve the livelihood of indigenous groups,
each bank has constructed individual units that allow for profound investigation and
communication. This means that both RDBs have opened up avenues for inspecting how
different projects might harm indigenous habitats and listening to what these groups most
immediate needs (whether this be education, health, etc.) may represent (Dalby, 1999).
Additionally, the IADB and ADB have dedicated themselves to poverty reduction and social
equity issues in what is dubbed as capital replenishment procedures. Rather than simply
avoiding project implementation that is detrimental to indigenous populations, the IADB has
vouched to target expenditures (mostly agricultural and social) more proactively at indigenous
demands (Deruyttere, 1997). Due to their widespread upscaling of pressure, the ADB has placed
certain projects on hold. It claims that its intention is to investigate the sociocultural and
economic consequences that these projects impose against villagers as a whole (Hirsch, 2001).
Another version of social interaction and, thus, identity formation exists through private
capital markets. Since member states only contribute a small paid-in share of total subscriptions,
they are not able to exert as much leverage as these private (which provide the bulk of financing)
entities. RDBs, therefore, operate accordingly to banking interests. The implementation of
projects (mainly physical infrastructure) that are best apt at securing future funds serve as the
backbone for RDB behavior (Humphrey, 2014). With the emergence of a regime such as
corporate social responsibility (CSR), however, private market incentives are not limited to pure
capitalist gain. Being impacted and influenced by civil society organizations (CSOs), CSR
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behavior may also assume the form of protecting both people and their immediate environments
from any private enterprise-led harm (Haslam, 2007).
The notion of ideational norms and self-identity might best explain why the AIIB has
come to fruition. Embedded and socialized by a neoliberal world order, China has adopted many
norms (infrastructure investment, economic liberalization, sustainable development, etc.) of the
Bretton Woods (BW) system (Johnston, 2008). Being that the AIIB was created and is led by
China, its purpose revolves around the latter country’s historical experience within IOs. The
existence of the AIIB, thus, can be perceived as a mere reflection of and complement to an IFI
such as the World Bank (Hanlon, 2017). Other research has pointed to the social engagements of
member states after, rather than prior, the AIIB’s emergence. Due to the AIIB having 50 nonregional members (including many pro-environment EU countries), its identity has been
influenced by these outside state actors. It can be said, then, that the AIIB’s recent turn toward
higher sustainability is a product of these social interaction processes (Chin, 2019).
Further constructivist research has turned to the internal dynamics of RDBs. For
instance, the adoption of an accountability mechanism (AM), public communication policy
(PCP), and safeguard policy (SP) in the ADB signals an accommodated institutional form.
Although not completely digressing from donor interests or the neoliberal world order, CSOs are
considered to be partially responsible for these sudden changes (Uhlin, 2015). In addition to
these policy measures, the ADB has imposed an anti-corruption practice onto its agenda. While
many different factors (i.e. Western donor pressures, Asian economic crisis, organizational
legitimacy concerns, etc.) might help to explain this more recent policy emergence, it is said that
global norm diffusion acts as a reliable predictor. The ADB, in other words, has made precedent
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of transfusing World Bank and other IO standards (notably anti-corruption) into its own regional
makeup (Komori, 2015).

Conclusion
Due to the many different theoretically driven interpretations that are in place, it is quite
easy to see why IR scholars vary in their opinions regarding international state behavior. As a
whole, realists view the global order as one that is dominated by hegemons. International
regimes and cooperation, thus, are a mere product of hegemonic willpower. In fact, these
particular scholars believe that middle power states join IOs in order to balance or play spoiler
against and to (with the purpose of promoting their own agenda) the status quo. Structural
realists, on the other hand, point to the way in which hegemons are able to control IOs. Looking
at a RDB like the IADB, for instance, they claim that the U.S. can dictate decisions via its
effective veto and relative voting power. Despite other states having a stake in the pie, it is these
structural imbalances that enable hegemonic dominance.
Liberals see international behavior as being guided by state preferences. These
preferences, hence, are typically motivated through domestic pressure groups. From this angle,
it can be said that international regimes and cooperation are determined by similar policy
outcomes. When state interests fall in line, in other words, cooperation takes place. Liberal
scholars argue that it is for this very reason that middle power states join IOs. Such states seek to
use the IOs in order to foster their aligned interests. Not digressing too far from the liberal
approach, the institutionalist perspective believes that middle power states coopt hegemonic
ideas for the purpose of bettering their position or status within IOs. Once they are able to
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improve their status, they can then either conform to and benefit from the status quo or exert
pressure for revisionary change. In RDBs, and particularly the IADB, liberals claim that states
are not bound by hegemonic willpower alone. While the U.S. may indeed possess significant
influence and voting power, it still requires the coalitional consent of other member states. It can
thus be assumed that these non-hegemonic states are converging their interests with the U.S.
In terms of the constructivist approach, international regimes and cooperation can be
viewed from the standpoint of social interaction processes. As states socially engage with one
another, they begin to adopt each other’s policies. This reality helps to explain why
constructivist scholars believe that the world order is composed of many unique regimes that lay
outside the sole realm of hegemonic influence. Most of these scholars argue that the ability to
enact soft power is the very reason that middle power states join IOs. Being able to sway the
U.S. into implementing their own policy desires provides middle power states an avenue to elicit
potential continuity and change. Since such endeavors are not incentivized by hegemons alone,
it can be said that cooperation is the product of mutual state interests. As for RDBs, with
specific emphasis on the IADB, constructivist scholars point to the notion of CSOs and other
influential groups. These groups, in other words, are responsible for pressuring member states
into adopting standards and procedures that conform to their goals. It is in this manner that nonhegemonic states and other entities are given the option to exert leverage upon the U.S.
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Chapter 3

Theoretical Framework

Introduction
I begin this chapter by discussing the central theoretical (liberalism) framework that
underlies the dissertation. In the attempt to do so, it is useful to highlight some basic tenants of
liberalism, revisit the main points of the literature discussed in Chapter 2, and discuss additional
cited works. These research groupings, collectively, provide the paper with both a rudimentary
and substantive ground point. Being that the liberal approach is a bit nuanced and somewhat
underused, it seems necessary to elaborate on its meaning even further. Once this more
grandiose perspective has been better aligned with the core argument, I think it proper to expand
upon the latter. With this being said, I aim to demonstrate how liberalism holds much
explanatory power in determining middle power (state) behavior at the regional and international
level. From this point forward, I intend to analytically critique competing paradigms while
revealing the overall impact and implications that are connected to such an overarching
theoretical (liberalism) phenomenon.

A Liberal Theoretical Framework
Not digressing too much from other IR theories, neoliberal institutionalism makes a
number of assumptions which are common to structural realism as well. The first assumption is
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premised on anarchy. Neoliberals, hence, believe that the international environment lacks any
authentic governmental authority. Consequently, states are left to engage in self-help
mechanisms and, therefore, fend for their own (Moravcsik, 2010). The second assumption
centers on rationality. States (taking the shape of leader implemented decisions) act accordingly
to their most sought-after interests. If a mode of behavior is deemed beneficial, then states will
cooperate. The more costly interdependence becomes, however, states are likely to sequester
themselves from such pragmatic entanglement (Milner, 1988).
According to the liberal school (and not completely distinct from other theories) of IR,
the notion of cooperation is premised around state preferences.5 These state preferences,
generally speaking, are a direct result of interest aggregation in domestic politics (Gourevitch,
1978). Since different factions exist within given societies, pluralism emerges as the norm. This
reality implies that similar or identical state preferences will likely produce a peaceful and
cooperative international system. A conflict of interests, therefore, is what induces imminent
hostility and controversy amongst states (Moravcsik, 1997).
In terms of militarized conflict, liberals remain committed to the notion of similar versus
dissimilar state preferences. For instance, it makes no sense for the U.S. to initiate warfare
against a country like Canada. Nothing is to be gained (while power balancing is unnecessary)
as this northern neighbor abides by Western behavioral norms (democracy, human rights, free
market capitalism, etc.) (Gartzke, 1998). This logic goes hand-in-hand with democratic peace

5

The version of liberalism that is being promoted throughout this dissertation relies heavily upon Andrew
Moravcsik’s (1997) notion of state preferences. Due to its more specific concepts and ideals, I find this type of
liberalism to be a bit distinct from classical liberalism. Although some parallels, however, do exist between
Moravcsik’s definition of liberalism and classical liberalism, I also find that the latter can create confusion. I do not
intend for the work of Enlightenment philosophers such as John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, or Immanuel Kant
to serve as the basis of my dissertation. On a further note, this dissertation is neither premised on neoliberal
institutionalist theory. Some neoliberal institutionalist authors’ works are simply used to provide alternate
theoretical perspective to the research argument.
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theory. Since domestic populaces within these regime types do not favor (as it infringes upon
principles of state sovereignty and international trade) war in general, they expect a peaceful
world order amongst each other (Doyle, 1986). With autocratic governments presenting
themselves as overly aggressive and often (whether it be fascism or Communism) countering
democratic interests, this divergence may lead to hostile responses from democracies (Chan,
1984). Enacting interventionist responses versus North Korea and Vietnam over the Cold War
era, therefore, was a mere product of ideological (Communism vs. capitalism) discrepancies.
State preferences, essentially, were not par with one another. Cooperation, thus, proceeds only
when these interests are parallel (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999).
As mentioned previously, state preferences typically take on the form (including
specialized groups) of their domestic populace (Rodrik, 1995). Although these groups engage
with domestic politics in certain aspects, they also possess a very transnational purpose. They
tend to consist of specialized professional experts in a given policy area. Cooperation, therefore,
is fostered at the international level when state preferences become similarly influenced by these
epistemic entities (Haas, 1992). Once again, power balancing politics are deemed as irrelevant
and unnecessary under these conditions. One notable example, in this sense, is the
Mediterranean Plan. A cohort of knowledgeable ecologists (epistemic community) asserted their
environmental concerns (declining ecosystem, increased pollution, and minimization of the
dolphin population) onto policymakers within the participant states. These states, thus,
responded by adopting the Plan with the intent to reduce such problems via mutual cooperative
efforts. The ideal of liberal cooperation here is not based on military conflict but environmental
interests amongst a community of states (Haas, 1989).
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The same argument might be present when considering IOs. Those states belonging to
IOs also submit themselves to epistemic influence (Haas, 1992). Ernst Haas uses an example
referencing a Bretton Woods organization such as the IMF. Regarding the IMF, expert liberal
economists across the West advocated for certain policy changes after the abandonment of the
gold standard in the early 1970s. Two of the more significant changes were floating (rather than
fixed) exchange rates and the disposal of capital controls. As these so-called specialists began to
attribute a lack of economic growth in direct relation to such previously held standards, Western
states cooperated by altering their preferences to meet this more newfound specified policy
criteria. Such mutual engagement and change between states within this IO exemplifies how
power balancing is not an incentive for cooperation. Liberal state preferences, then, are not
always premised on materialist competition (Haas, 1990).
Another form of non-conflictual liberal cooperation exists between democratic and
autocratic governments. In one account, it was noted how both forms of political regime types
share the same preferences in certain issue areas (Held, 2010). A good example of this reality
might be located within the environmental and gender equality realms. Although not always
abided by in principle or practice, many of these states have participated in hallmark events like
the 1992 Earth Summit and 1995 Conference on Women. Despite such ideological
(governmental regime type and human rights) differences that exist, democracies and
autocracies, nonetheless, strive to reach ongoing modes of consensus and cooperation when they
fulfill preferential outcomes (Held, 1998).
The liberal approach applies to my argument at hand primarily in terms of economics.
As trade, investment, and economic integration increases within the Latin American and
Caribbean region, member states have further incentive to expand upon their capital subscription
35

commitments in the IADB. It is not difficult to envision the logic for state preferences here.
With the steady pervasiveness of globalization, MNCs and other big businesses often receive the
net benefits of enhanced socioeconomic development and economic engagement with the
developing world. Of course, it would be foolish to assume that all entrepreneurial entities
absorb maximum rewards from such a systemic order. In fact, many domestic enterprises are
actually punished (loss of money or closure) by the repercussions of globalization. This reality
helps to explain why certain sectors (thanks to political lobbying) oftentimes gain protection
(whether it be through tariffs, export subsidies, etc.) via their respected governments. The
bottom line, however, is that most post-industrial societies require external goods (primary and
manufactured) to fulfill domestic demand. The same principle remains in effect when looking at
the positions of pre-industrial and secondary economies. Since they depend on
manufactured/service and agricultural/service output, international trade serves as a very useful
purpose. My argument, therefore, is based on the idea that capital elites tend to drive state
preferences and, hence, are responsible for numerous decisions at the global level.
Aside from the economic aspect of liberalism, I do not deny that other factions exist.
Pressure groups can come in many forms as they live to exert ample influence across their
respected states. For instance, an international non-governmental organization (INGO) such as
Greenpeace is widely regarded as the most visible and active environmental group in the
contemporary world. The political leverage that it wields, indeed, has become noted as highly
accountable for “green” decisions across both the domestic and global spectrums. In fact, it is
said that INGOs of this sort are why RDBs and IFIs have implemented environmental safeguard
policies in their lending behavior. Again, this phenomenon helps to illustrate that liberalism
must not be reduced to a simple economic component. I merely focus on an international

36

political economy (IPE) perspective due to the core argument of my dissertation. Given the
acknowledgment of these competing interest groups and the rationality-based structure of the
theoretical approach, I believe this paper falls short of Marxist or critical theory categorization.
Although both middle and lesser powers constitute the units of analyses, one may wonder
as to why the former type has been selected as the focal point of research. The primary reason
that I implement this approach is to challenge the conventional wisdom of realist thought. In a
globalized world that is still defined by many (particularly realists) as a cornerstone for power
politics, it seems only necessary to dissect the truer intentions of those states that are able to
challenge (or support) the existing hierarchy and rule of the international system. Being that
such supposed challengers are typically classified as middle or emerging powers, it makes sense
to scrutinize them above all else. Lesser power states, in other words, do not possess the material
capabilities to pose any significant or direct threat to U.S. hegemony. I have made it a point,
nonetheless, to incorporate lesser powers into my analysis anyways. My basis for this approach
is simple. If both middle and lesser powers demonstrate tendencies to increase RDB capital
subscriptions (which provides an avenue to further trade) as their overall level of trade accrues in
the given region, then it can be inferred that each member state is satisfactorily living (via mutual
gains that are associated with liberal theory) under the umbrella of the Washington Consensus.
Because capital subscriptions, thus, serve as a catalyst for fostering the net benefits of trade (state
preferences), they are critical for upholding the liberal argument. This brand of reasoning would
also help explain why lesser powers continue to agree raising their aggregate number of
subscriptions when they are often obliged to sacrifice voting rights via middle power-led
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coalition blocs.6 When state preferences are coherently aligned, the desired outcomes matter
more than any procedural technique.
What are the implications of middle power behavior? Since my argument is based on the
theoretical concept of liberalism and, therefore, that state preferences take shape around the
current neoliberal world order, I believe that middle power states do not aim or wish to revise the
status quo. With this being said, these states are more than happy dwelling through the guidance
of hegemonic stability. Mutual, instead of relative, gains hold highest precedence amongst such
potentially competing entities. Middle powers are supportive of this arrangement, in part,
because multinational firms from all economic sectors across various countries are most
influential as they receive the net benefits of this contemporary global system. I do not think
they will be willing to risk the overall value of these monetary rewards for the sake of minute or
redundant revisionary alterations.
Piggybacking on this assessment, I want to relate it to the current international questions
that arise today. Middle/emerging powers like China, Russia, India, Brazil, and so forth should
not be viewed as imminent threats to Western neoliberalism or U.S. hegemony. They merely
seek to complement rather than overturn the status quo. International associations and IOs like
BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and AIIB, thus, ought to be welcomed with

6

Although the 48 member Board of Governors (one for each state) represent the highest body of authority in the
IADB, they often delegate responsibilities to the 14 member Board of Executive Directors. These directors, in turn,
are elected by members located within their select voting blocs. While the U.S. and Canada constitute their own
IADB voting blocs, other members are compacted together. Typically, these blocs (voting groups) are composed of
non-regional with non-regional, and regional with regional, members. When possible (as some blocs consist strictly
of lesser power states), blocs tend to be led by middle power states. Although lesser powers’ capital subscription
shares and, therefore, weighted votes are still integral to the voting process, only the leader (dictator) of the bloc can
actually cast votes (see Strand, 2003).
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open arms. These organizational bodies can fill both development and security
(counterterrorism) voids that have become incessantly prevalent across the world.

Limitations of Competing Theoretical Frameworks
The next step that I address here is why liberalism offers the best explanation for my
argument. I shall begin by recognizing that liberalism does not contain a universal element and,
thus, other theories hold substantive power in their own right. Looking at neoliberal
institutionalism, it can be argued that member states in RDBs assent to increase capital
subscriptions because they have garnered iterated information over the years. These states, in
other words, are able to develop steadfast expectations of one another’s behavior. When actions
fall parallel, transaction costs are lowered and regimes for lending may erupt. The reason that I
tend to question such a claim in this regard is due to the ambiguous nature of regimes. For
instance, the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) has yet to unleash its imminent and sought-after
effects (lower trade barriers and further trade liberalization). It is a direct result of clashing state
preferences amongst developed and between developed and developing countries. An even
better example, perhaps, is the success and failure of the SCO. While member states have
achieved much cooperation in security measures, not so much has been witnessed toward
establishing a free trade zone. State preferences are very similar on one account but vastly
different (mainly between China and Russia) on the other hand. Regimes are only useful as long
as they meet the preferential demands of states.
Using a constructivist framework, the argument can be made that many member states in
RDBs behave accordingly to socially adopted norms. As these states engage in a repeated
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interactive setting, they are bound to hold some degree of influence over one another. This
reality might help to explain why the ADB has taken steps to impose accountability mechanisms,
transparency initiatives, or environmental protectionist policies. It is easy to see, however, that
an abundance of these states will only abide by such practices so long as they do not hamper
longer-term goals. For instance, much to the chagrin of human rights and environmental
activists, the ADB has pushed through with highly controversial projects (often leading to
environmental degradation and involuntary resettlement) like Mae Moh (coal-fired power
station) in Thailand and elsewhere. The point here is that it seems a bit simplistic to assume that
those states belonging to RDBs, IFIs, or IOs in general make decisions based on pure persuasive
dialogue. With this being said, I find it neither unlikely nor improbable that states will submit
themselves to local pressure groups. Identities and interests, thus, can emerge in this way. I
believe the result, then, is better explained by domestically-driven factors (liberalism) rather than
an intersubjective meaning (constructivism) implanted from the outside.
The final theoretical perspective that I seek to evaluate is realism. I believe the realist
notion falls far short of offering any substantive explanatory power regarding RDB behavior. In
terms of balancing, member states have not attempted to align themselves against the U.S.
hegemon. A good reason for this stance, perhaps, centers on the idea that these states are content
with the status quo. Being that they receive ample benefits from the current neoliberal world
order, member states have little, if any, incentive to change it. Going even a step further, one
would probably wonder as to what sense it makes to increase capital subscriptions when constant
distortions of relative power may effect disequilibrium and, thus, create warfare. Using another
realist account, I do not think that the spoiler effect provides much insight either. Yes,
hypothetically speaking, it can be said that many of these states are eventually going to use their
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relative gains in order to exact some form of revision. Again, this strategy appears to be very
foolish when it would merely serve to disrupt what is a seemingly benevolent systemic order.
The potential sacrifice, in other words, could be monumental in exchange for something
minimal. Rather than focusing on power politics alone, realists might fare better if they were to
consider an actual balance of threat mechanism. As long as member states in Western-led IOs
play by the rules of the game (neoliberalism), they have no reason to fear and, therefore, balance
or go spoiler against the U.S. hegemon.
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Chapter 4

Data and Methodology

Introduction
In this study, I examine one particular RDB, the IADB. The reasons that I have selected
the IADB for analysis are fairly straightforward. It consists of both regional (e.g. Argentina and
Brazil) and non-regional (e.g. the U.S. and Germany) member countries. While the former type
serve as both donor and recipient, its non-regional counterpart acts solely as a donor. Another
trait of the IADB is that it relies on a weighted voting system in order to make decisions. Since
the regional member countries occupy a majority shareholder stake (50.02%) within the bank,
coalitions are required for enactment. This reality means that hegemonic powers alone cannot
determine RDB outcomes. The U.S., for instance, must be able to acquire the weighted votes of
other non-regional (most notably European) member countries if it seeks to perform an ordinary
veto decision.
Although non-regional member countries exist in the IADB, their shareholder stakes are
different. The U.S., for example, owns roughly 30% of weighted voting in the bank, yet, the
next highest, Japan, only witnesses about 5%. While the superpower is the largest shareholder in
the bank, it still requires the approval of other non-regional members if decisions are to be made
in its favor. The implication behind such claims are rather simplistic. Despite the U.S.
possessing a relatively higher stake and, therefore, needing fewer coalitions in the IADB, its
interests are nonetheless dependent on vast support across fellow non-regional countries.
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The origin and history of the bank are a bit distinguished as well. Initially proposed in
1890 at the first Pan-American Conference, the IADB was intended to serve as an interAmerican organization that would foster multilateral cooperation amongst regional members.
The purpose, in other words, centered on the establishment of a customs union, legal measures to
settle territorial disputes, and so forth. Eventually founded in 1959 against the backdrop of
Communism, this RDB hosted many non-regional members for the purpose of geopolitical and
strategic alliance. These external states were essentially brought in to act as bulwarks against
any possible leftist-driven decisions.
On a final note, I find it useful to explore the difference in non-regional members. Most
non-regional members are from North America and Europe. In fact, only four (China, Israel,
Japan, and South Korea) states are from outside of the Western region. No countries from Africa
are current members. The IADB, especially when compared to other RDBs (i.e. AfDB), has
seen little influx of non-regional members (22 versus 26) over a longer course of time. These
realities beg for questions and answers as to why such happenings are taking place. If the nonregional member position within the IADB is not very well-pronounced, then I believe it makes
much sense to explore why this actuality (status quo) tends to be the norm.
The selected time-series for this study is 2004-2018. Although spanning only 15 years, I
have chosen this time period because of limited data availability. The IADB, for instance, does
not allow direct access to its annual reports prior to the year 2000. Additionally, there are a
couple of missing years (1996 and 1999) from its working website. Despite such lack of data, I
believe that this time-series, nonetheless, is highly beneficial. My reason for saying so is in
direct connection to the substantial changes that have occurred within this RDB over the given
time. From 2004-2018, Canada and Japan (two of the IADB’s non-regional shareholders)--often
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considered to be middle powers--have seen their total subscriptions multiply by nearly double.
In 2004, the number was at just over $4 and $5 million, respectively. Today, those numbers are
approximately $7 and $9 million. As one of the IADB’s largest regional shareholders, Brazil,
which is also classified as a middle power, had total subscriptions of right below $11 million in
2004. In 2018, this figure fell barely underneath $20 million. Due to the consistency of such
changes over an extended period, I find it both pertinent and very useful to implement a study
bound within a mere 15 year time frame.

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the change in IADB capital subscriptions for each donor and
year. The data are in log form to normalize the measure. I employ the first-difference in the log
of subscription shares, which yields the percentage change. In order to properly assess the IADB
data, I collected the information from the IADB website (https://www.iadb.org/en/aboutus/annual-reports). While the IADB contains ample information (annual reports spanning over
decades), it only grants public access to its records from 2000-2018. Regardless of such a
limitation, I still believe that the IADB provides a proper amount of necessary information for
coding. Using 15 years of annual data, in other words, is believed to be sufficient for the
purpose of this work. Because the dependent variable is continuous, the equations will be
estimated for a cross-sectional time-series model. Diagnostics suggested that the pooled
estimator is more appropriate than random or fixed effects. The models include corrections to
the standard errors (panel correction) for heteroscedasticity (see Beck and Katz, 1995).
However, the pooled autocorrelation parameter (rho) for the first-differenced-models was
relatively small, and as such, no corrections are implemented.
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In order to better understand how capital subscriptions are defined throughout this
dissertation, and the processes by which they operate, I provide a detailed account here.
Although capital subscriptions can be understood in various ways (i.e. as symbols of weighted
voting power), they are also a critical foreign aid tool. Capital subscription shares provide the
resources for the bank’s concessional finance and multilateral assistance programs (IADB,
2020). However, it should be noted that the enactment of capital subscription replenishments in
the IADB does not occur on a regular or annual basis. Member states only convene every so
often to determine if they want continuity or change in their subscription shares. In fact, the
General Capital Increase (GCI) cycles can last for as briefly as a few years (e.g. 1990-1993,
GCI-7; 2011-2015, GCI-9) years, or many years (e.g. 1994-2010, GCI-8). After the members
have agreed to the capital increase, “…parliaments in each of its member countries seek
legislative approvals to subscribe and contribute as well as the budgetary appropriation of the
necessary funds” (IADB, 2020).
Certain provisions exist, however, that allow member states to alter their designated
amount (whether these be paid-in or callable contributions) within a given GCI cycle, and this
may include annual changes to subscription shares. This claim is supported by evidence noted in
the IADB “GCI-9” report (2010: 39-91). Since this option has become readily available, many
members have acted upon their opportunities to increase (and/or decrease) individual funding.
Such instances are revealed throughout the list of annual IADB reports, (see, e.g., IADB website
https://www.iadb.org/en/about-us/annual-reports). To catch a glimpse of the comparisons
between members, the data in Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate moments of clear change within the
GCI-9 cycle. As might be expected, though, not all states change their shares on an annual basis.
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Because there is no obligation to shift subscription amounts, even if other members do so, some
totals remain stationery.
To summarize, then, there is evidence of some annual change in subscription shares
during the time-series for my study, and there was at least one major change during the period in
question. Perhaps more important, my estimation method – which is a pooled population
estimator – will yield the effects of the covariates on the average first-differenced change in
subscription shares across all donors (including middle powers) and years. In other words, the
models capture the average effect of the key independent variables on the change in subscription
shares – from GCI events and annual variation – among all members, including middle powers.
Thus, modeling capital subscription shares as the dependent variable is reasonable for the
purposes of my research question.
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Table 1
IADB Member Countries’ Subscriptions to Capital Stock and Contribution Quotas (2013)

Member
Countries

Paid-In Ordinary
Capital Stock

Total Capital
Stock

538.2

Callable
Ordinary Capital
Stock
13331.1

13869.3

FSO
Contribution
Quotas
532.2

Argentina
Austria

7.9

192.7

200.6

21.0

Bahamas

13.0

255.5

268.5

11.2

Barbados

6.5

159.8

166.3

1.9

Belgium

16.2

396.9

413.1

44.6

Belize

7.9

133.9

141.8

8.0

Bolivia

43.2

1070.5

1113.7

51.1

Brazil

538.2

13331.1

13869.3

573.2

Canada

197.9

7906.1

8104.0

328.9

Chile

147.8

3660.7

3808.5

166.1

China

0.1

3.1

3.2

131.1

Colombia

147.8

3660.7

3808.5

161.2

Costa Rica

21.6

535.4

557.0

24.5

Croatia

2.4

58.4

60.8

6.2

Denmark

8.4

205.0

213.4

21.0

Dominican
Republic
Ecuador

28.8

714.6

743.4

35.7

28.8

714.6

743.4

31.9
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El Salvador

21.6

535.4

557.0

22.5

Finland

7.9

192.7

200.6

19.9

France

93.7

2292.9

2386.6

232.8

Germany

93.7

2292.9

2386.6

241.3

Guatemala

28.8

714.6

743.4

34.4

Guyana

8.9

197.9

206.8

8.7

Haiti

21.6

535.4

557.0

22.9

Honduras

21.6

535.4

557.0

27.8

Israel

7.8

190.0

197.8

18.0

Italy

93.7

2292.9

2386.6

227.2

Jamaica

28.8

714.6

743.4

30.2

Japan

247.4

6050.2

6297.6

623.3

Mexico

346.0

8569.5

8915.5

346.4

Netherlands

14.6

325.6

340.3

36.9

Nicaragua

21.6

535.4

557.0

25.4

Norway

8.4

205.0

213.4

21.0

Panama

21.6

535.4

557.0

26.7

Paraguay

21.6

535.4

557.0

29.3

Peru

72.0

1784.2

1856.2

84.0

Portugal

2.6

65.1

67.7

8.2

Slovenia

1.5

35.5

37.0

3.6

South Korea

0.1

3.1

3.2

1.0

Spain

93.7

2292.9

2386.6

226.4
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Suriname

6.3

107.2

113.5

6.6

Sweden

16.1

394.5

410.6

42.2

Switzerland

23.3

569.0

592.3

67.1

Trinidad and
Tobago
United Kingdom

21.6

535.4

557.0

22.0

47.6

1164.5

1212.1

183.9

United States

1484.9

36309.5

37794.4

5076.4

Uruguay

57.7

1429.6

1487.3

58.7

Venezuela

249.3

5568.5

5817.8

315.3

Total Amount

4941.1

123840.0

128781.1

10239.7

Note: Data are calculated by millions of U.S. dollars, and are rounded; detail may not add to
grand total because of rounding. Non-voting temporary callable shares with a par value of
$3,066 million are actually present in this year. FSO contributions are no longer separate;
amounts are now added into ordinary capital stock.
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Table 2
IADB Member Countries’ Subscriptions to Capital Stock and Contribution Quotas (2014)

Member
Countries

Paid-In Ordinary
Capital Stock

Total Capital
Stock

589.8

Callable
Ordinary Capital
Stock
15403.0

15992.8

FSO
Contribution
Quotas
532.2

Argentina
Austria

8.5

219.5

228.0

21.0

Bahamas

13.7

284.2

297.9

11.2

Barbados

7.1

184.5

191.6

1.9

Belgium

17.6

451.7

469.3

44.6

Belize

8.5

155.3

163.8

8.0

Bolivia

47.3

1237.1

1284.4

51.1

Brazil

538.2

13331.1

13869.3

573.2

Canada

214.5

6896.1

7110.6

329.7

Chile

162.0

4229.8

4391.8

166.1

China

0.1

3.8

3.9

131.1

Colombia

162.0

4229.8

4391.8

161.2

Costa Rica

23.7

618.8

642.5

24.5

Croatia

2.6

66.7

69.3

6.2

Denmark

9.1

233.4

242.5

21.0

Dominican
Republic
Ecuador

31.6

825.8

857.4

35.7

31.6

824.2

855.8

31.9
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El Salvador

23.6

617.6

641.2

22.5

Finland

8.5

219.5

228.0

19.9

France

101.6

2608.5

2710.1

232.8

Germany

101.6

2608.5

2710.1

241.3

Guatemala

30.8

793.4

824.2

34.4

Guyana

9.5

220.0

229.5

8.7

Haiti

23.6

617.6

641.2

22.9

Honduras

23.7

618.8

642.5

27.8

Israel

8.4

216.4

224.8

18.0

Italy

101.6

2608.5

2710.1

227.2

Jamaica

30.8

793.4

824.2

30.2

Japan

268.1

6882.5

7150.6

623.3

Mexico

379.1

9901.6

10280.7

346.4

Netherlands

14.6

325.6

340.2

36.9

Nicaragua

23.6

617.6

641.2

25.4

Norway

9.1

233.4

242.5

21.0

Panama

23.6

617.6

641.2

26.7

Paraguay

23.6

617.6

641.2

29.3

Peru

78.9

2061.6

2140.5

84.0

Portugal

2.9

74.2

77.1

8.2

Slovenia

1.6

40.7

42.3

3.6

South Korea

0.1

3.8

3.9

1.0

Spain

103.3

2677.6

2780.9

226.4

51

Suriname

6.6

119.4

126.0

6.6

Sweden

17.5

448.9

466.4

42.2

Switzerland

25.2

647.5

672.7

67.3

Trinidad and
Tobago
United Kingdom

23.1

594.5

617.6

22.0

51.6

1324.8

1376.4

183.9

United States

1609.1

41303.1

42912.2

5076.4

Uruguay

63.2

1652.0

1715.2

58.7

Venezuela

249.3

5568.5

5817.8

315.3

Total Amount

5357.0

138901.0

144258.0

10240.0

Note: Data are calculated by millions of U.S. dollars, and are rounded; detail may not add to
grand total because of rounding. Non-voting temporary callable shares with a par value of
$1,390 million are actually present in this year. All states, except Canada, the Netherlands, and
Venezuela, see a net increase in their ordinary capital stock; Canada actually witnesses a net
decrease. Total FSO contributions show a slight increase; few states increased their total
amount. FSO contributions are no longer separate; amounts are now added into ordinary capital
stock.
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Independent Variable and Controls
The main independent variable is bilateral trade between IADB members and the Latin
American and Caribbean region. I include this economic indicator because it is directly linked to
prior research about state preferences associated with liberal theory. With that being said, the
trade covariate serves as a proxy for the alignment of middle power and U.S. state preferences.
The measures for trade are in constant 2010 dollars and log-transformed. For middle power, I
employ the interaction term of middle power’s trade (log, in constant 2010 million of dollars)
with the Latin American region. I expect that higher trade between the middle power and the
region will, on average, increase the probability of an increase of the middle power’s capital
share in the IADB. For bilateral trade, the data is retrieved from the IMF Direction of Trade
Statistics, the Correlates of War (COW) https://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/bilateraltrade, and the WTO https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/trade_datasets_e.htm.
I also include several controls in the model. The first control is the degree of voting
affinity between the middle power and the U.S. in the United Nations General Assembly
(UNGA). This measure is a proxy for U.S. hegemonic influence toward middle power states.
The measure is taken from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2015). A lack of hegemonic success
to sway middle power states in the UNGA, or a divergence between UNGA vote-buying and
middle power versus U.S. capital subscription shares (increase versus decrease in capital
subscription shares or vice-versa), falls more in line with the precepts of liberal theory. On the
other hand, if there is a strong association between UNGA voting affinity scores and decisions
on capital subscriptions, then it can be assumed that IADB member states might be operating
through the dictates of U.S. hegemony. This mode of reasoning is directly linked to the notion of
structural realism.
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In terms of the political orientation of incumbent governments, this control is directly
linked to a society-centered framework. Prior literature suggests that domestic politics often
imposes a heavy impact on donor aid policies (Irwin, 2000; Lancaster, 2008; Milner and Tingley,
2010). Subnational level influences, in other words, are primarily responsible for the allocation
and increase or decrease of foreign aid. More particular, ample research reveals that a change in
the ruling political party is what ultimately determines aid volatility (Bulir and Lane, 2002; Eifert
and Gelb, 2005). Hence, leftist governments are more likely than their right-wing counterparts
to distribute vast amounts of official development assistance (ODA). Some studies, in fact,
demonstrate that such domestic political variables (partisan ideology) actually affect aid
disbursement between donors and multilateral recipients (Tingley, 2010). It is for this reason
that the left-wing incumbent governments of middle power states might be suspected to increase
capital subscriptions while their rightist adversaries do the opposite. For the purpose of coding, I
resort to an ordinal scale of “1” for left and “2” for center, and “3” for right. The data is
retrieved from a global database compiled by researchers at the World Bank Development
Research Group. Known as the Database of Political Institutions 2017, it can be located at the
following website, https://publications.iadb.org/en/database-political-institutions-2017-dpi2017.
The middle power dummy variable is used in order to distinguish the effect that middle
power states and lesser power states have on total subscription shares. Not that there is an
expected (as both middle and smaller powers benefit from mutual gains) difference among these
states, but due to diverging (as discussed in Chapter 5) strategies such as aid-follows-trade
(which predicts more foreign assistance for middle powers) and trade-not-aid (which predicts
less foreign assistance for middle powers), it seems only necessary to institute this control. In
terms of coding, I implement a binary approach. The number “0” represents not a middle, or
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therefore lesser, power, while “1” represents middle power. To arrive at a sufficient definition of
middle powers, I draw on the previously aforementioned literature on middle powers (see
Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, 1993; Holbraad, 1984; Cox and Sinclair, 1996), and operationalize
the concept in a way that combines elements from realist, liberal, and ideational approaches.
Middle powers, in this sense, are classified by their median position in the world economy, state
(potential military) capacity, and willpower to engage in prominent international associations or
IOs. For the latter aspect, I look at which of the IADB member states are also members of
highly recognized global entities, including the G20, UNSC, BRICS, and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).7 Because they have chosen to be members of
these most notable international bodies, I operationalize under the assumption that such states are
trying to instrumentally assert (via prominent decision-making roles) themselves within the
world order.
The regional borrower dummy variable is used to assess the impact that being a regional
borrowing member or not has on total capital subscriptions. Again, not that a probabilistic
difference is anticipated here, but due to hypothesized (as discussed in Chapter 5) reasons that
could potentially benefit (i.e. higher amounts of directly utilized multilateral aid) regional
members versus those which further assist (i.e. financial liberalization or foreign direct
investment (FDI) opportunities) non-regional members, it appears proper to include this control.
The coding, once again, is performed using a binary scale. The number “0” typifies not a

7

As noted above and earlier in the dissertation, this particular classification of middle powers is an amalgamation of
the definitions listed in Chapter 1. Of specific emphasis, however, is the willpower to engage in prominent
international associations and IOs. If a state does not meet this criteria, then it is not considered to be a middle
power. Median position in the world economy and state capacity, therefore, only matter so much as countries
demonstrate a tendency to actually assert themselves through well-known international bodies. Although the
categorization put forth is not wholly unique, it is my own. Other types and subtypes (as will be seen in Chapter 5),
though, do exist and might be used to challenge or alter the meaning (at least in this context) of middle powers.
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regional borrowing member while “1” typifies a regional borrowing member. Not surprisingly,
the method of implementation is rather straightforward. Those countries which are able to
receive funds from the IADB meet the latter criteria, as states which cannot fall into the former
category.

Methodology
The research approach that is taken in this dissertation consists of quantitative
methodology. I use a cross-sectional time-series analysis to demonstrate whether an increase of
bilateral trade causes middle state donors to subscribe for more capital in RDBs. The nonregional donor countries that have been selected for examination include Austria, Belgium,
Canada, China, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom.8 Since most (i.e. notable exception being Croatia) of these countries have
qualified (either partially or wholly throughout the examined time-series) as middle or emerging
powers, in accordance to common descriptive standards, and are also members of the IADB, it
seems fitting to integrate them into this type of methodological study.9 On an additional note, I

8

These are the years in which each of the selected non-regional members became middle powers as relevant to my
given time-series estimates: Austria (2004), Belgium (2004), Canada (2004), China (2004), Denmark (2004),
Finland (2004), France (2004), Germany (2004), Israel (2010), Italy (2004), Japan (2004), the Netherlands (2004),
Norway (2004), Portugal (2004), Slovenia (2010), South Korea (2004), Spain (2004), Sweden (2004), Switzerland
(2004), United Kingdom (2004). As noted above, Croatia does not meet the criteria for middle power status. As
noted above, however, Chapter 5 presents an alternative trial (in a footnote) that shows the results are robust to an
alternative coding system which yields fewer middle powers.
9
On a further note, I think it is worth mentioning why some non-regional states (e.g. South Korea (2005) and China
(2009)) choose to join RDBs such as the IADB and, thus, why others (i.e. South Africa or Turkey) do not. My
central suspicion is that those who enter have increasing economic stakes (whether this be through FDI or trade) at
hand, while those who stay out are either limited in their financial transactions within the given region or fiscally
disengaged altogether. Of course, for countries like Russia, not entering the IADB is probably more of a
geopolitical choice, as it tries to promote its own (attempted) hegemonic influence in the region.
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want to point out that the U.S. (largest non-regional donor) is excluded from the data. Being that
it operates as the world hegemon, there is little doubt that its primary aims revolve around
maintaining a position of both structural and relative power within the international order. While
the U.S. does not publish its voting records in the IADB, it, nonetheless, can be assumed that the
superpower will act against any decision that jeopardizes or threatens its relative power and,
therefore, status of hegemon.
Also, I have decided to include all regional members as well. Whether they are regional
borrowing middle powers such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, or lesser power states
like the remainder of the regional members, it seems necessary to assess the overall impact that
trade has on capital subscriptions.10 By implementing this approach, additional cases are
incorporated into the study, thus, allowing for more substantive generalizations. In order to
control for the effect of middle powers alone, I interact them with bilateral trade. This way the
results are specifically focused on middle power states. Due to such a vast amount of cases, the
quantitative approach appears best fit to produce the most generalizable results.

10

These are the years in which each of the selected regional members became middle powers as relevant to my
given time-series estimates: Argentina (2009), Brazil (2009), Chile (2010), and Mexico (2004). As noted above,
the remaining regional members do not meet the criteria for middle power status.
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Chapter 5

Results and Analysis

Introduction
In this chapter, I present the results of the statistical regression models. I decided to
estimate four linear regression models. The first regression model is a baseline model. It
presents the dependent variable as a first difference in the log of capital subscription shares, and
estimates the effect of the main covariates of interest. However, the dependent variable is run as
a first difference in the log of capital subscription shares. This technique helps to measure the
percentage change in the log of capital subscriptions for each country and year on average. The
second regression model is similar to the baseline model, but with particular emphasis on the
interaction term between middle powers and trade with Latin America and the Caribbean. In
other words, the second model specifies the effect of middle powers’ trade with Latin America
and the Caribbean region on capital subscription shares. To show the robustness of the results,
the third regression model is estimated with a different measure of the dependent variable, the
log of total subscription shares. The fourth regression model includes an interactive term
between middle powers and trade and, thus, represents the sole difference with model three.
After presenting the results for each model, I offer a brief interpretation. Once this setup
is in place and completed, I turn to a broader discussion. This section is primarily used to
provide support for a liberal interpretation of the models. Also, this section highlights alternate
ways in which liberalism can be viewed, and the various forms it can take in shaping middle
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powers’ behavior in regional development banks. With this introduction now in order, I proceed
to the models themselves.

Results
Table 1 presents the baseline model (Model 1). As one can see, the main independent
variable is consistent with expectations of trade on all donor behavior. The coefficient for the
log of trade is both positive and significant. This finding suggests that the percentage change in
the log of IADB members’ subscription shares increase as their trade with Latin America and the
Caribbean goes up. However, it is important to note that the trade variable in Model 1 applies to
all donors. We will need to examine the interaction term for middle powers and trade to
understand if the effect holds for that subgroup. I shall touch upon this point in a later section.
As for the control variables in Model 1, they all achieve statistical significance with the
exception of the regional borrower dummy variable. However, the signs for some coefficients in
Model 1 run opposite to expectations. The coefficient for the political orientation covariate,
surprisingly, is significant and positive. It is important to recall that for this variable higher
values are associated with more conservative partisan control of government. The model
suggests, then, that left-wing governments are actually less inclined to increase multilateral
assistance, as measured by the percentage change in the log of subscription shares. Not only
does this result run contrary to my expectation, but it also defies the conventional wisdom of
many foreign aid scholars.
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Table 3
Determinants of Change in IADB Subscription Shares (Model 1, Baseline)

Covariate

Coefficient

P-Value

0.0561582

Panel-Corrected
Standard Error
0.0254739

Trade (log)
Political Orientation

0.0237541

0.0114592

0.038

Voting Affinity

0.2386509

0.1256302

0.057

Middle Power

-0.1215967

0.0652351

0.062

Regional Borrower

-0.0508746

0.0390038

0.192

Constant

-0.5555111

0.1971557

0.005

Number Observations

652

R-Square

0.1039

Wald Chi-Square

22.50

0.027

0.0004

Note: Dependent variable is the first-difference in the log of subscription shares.
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The coefficient for voting affinity shows an unanticipated result. I expected an
insignificant relationship between members’ voting affinity with the U.S. in the UN General
Assembly and their IADB subscription shares. However, the coefficient is positive and
significant, suggesting that there is indeed a strong positive relationship between UNGA voting
and the change in log of subscription shares. This finding suggests that IADB member
countries’ decisions may be swayed by U.S. influence with the bank. If these states do respond
to such hegemonic pressure, then perhaps there is room for neorealist interpretation.
The results for the middle power dummy variable in Model 1 also run counter to my
expectation. Given the negative coefficient, the percentage change in the log of subscription
shares in the IADB is negative, on average, and all things being equal. Once again, however, the
results of Model 2 offer additional and differing perspective on this matter. The effect, therefore,
appears sketchy at best.
Next, I discuss the results for Model 2, in Table 2. Along with Model 1, the main
independent (trade) variable in Table 2 is statistically significant and in the positive direction.
While this relationship is on par with expectation, the interaction variable between trade and
middle powers displays a much different outcome. As mentioned above, this specific interaction
term reveals that there is actually a statistically significant and negative relationship for middle
powers. The coefficient for the interaction term shows that among middle powers, every unit
increase in middle powers’ trade with Latin America and the Caribbean is associated with a
decrease in the percentage change of their subscription shares. This reality suggests that the
relationship between middle powers and trade is contrary to expectation.

61

Table 4
Determinants of Change in IADB Subscription Shares with Interaction Term (Model 2)

Covariate

Coefficient

P-Value

0.0836937

Panel-Corrected
Standard Error
0.0348864

Trade (log)
Political Orientation

0.0349608

0.0120359

0.004

Voting Affinity

0.200928

0.1252618

0.109

Middle Power

0.6202892

0.2362318

0.009

Regional Borrower

-0.0393449

0.0364358

0.280

Trade and Middle
Power Interaction
Term
Constant

-0.0802723

0.0323784

0.013

-0.7985137

0.2712238

0.003

Number Observations

652

R-Square

0.1417

Wald Chi-Square

45.56

0.016

0.0000

Note: Dependent variable is the first-difference in the log of subscription shares.
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The control variables in Model 2 are similar to the results discussed previously. The
coefficient for political orientation is both statistically significant and in the positive direction.
Once again, this result suggests that more conservative governments are associated with a
percentage increase in subscription shares. If state preferences (i.e. trade) are responsible for
motivating members’ behavior, then one would think of political orientation as irrelevant.
Additionally, and as stated above, the result is inconsistent with the literature that hypothesizes
that left-wing governments are more likely to disburse multilateral aid.
Although the coefficient for voting affinity remains positive in Model 2, it is not
statistically significant. This result is much more on line with the anticipated outcome. The
critical narrative here, thus, is that IADB member states are not necessarily giving into U.S.
pressure. This argument goes more in hand with a liberal theoretical approach rather than
structural realism. However, given that the results for voting affinity are not consistent across
models, it is difficult to draw any broad conclusions for this variable.
While the coefficient for the regional borrower dummy remains statistically insignificant
in Model 2, the middle power dummy variable is statistically significant but in the positive
direction. This result differs from the one in Model 1 in that middle powers are associated with a
higher percentage change in their subscription, but not when their trade with the region is
growing. As mentioned above, this relationship runs counter from what is anticipated. Being
that the coefficients are negative in Model 1 and positive in Model 2, it can be inferred that this
dummy variable is inconsistent.
To examine whether the results are robust to alternative specifications, I also present two
models where the dependent variable is the log of subscription shares (Models 3-4, in Tables 34). Consistent with Models 1 and 2, the coefficients for the log of trade in Models 3 and 4 are
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both positive and statistically significant. This result falls directly in line with one of the
arguments in this dissertation. As IADB member states experience an increase in trade in the
Latin America and Caribbean region, they raise their total amount of capital subscriptions.
However, as with Model 2, there is a very different effect between middle powers and trade in
Model 4. As a result, the finding does not hold among middle powers.11
The findings for the control variables in Models 3 and 4 are fairly straightforward. The
coefficients for political orientation, while remaining in the positive direction, are statistically
insignificant in Models 3 and 4 (Tables 3 and 4). These results are much different from the ones
of Models 1 and 2. With this being said, the models demonstrate that my expectation of leftist,
centrist, and rightist governments having the same probability of equal influence on total
subscription shares may indeed be accurate. Further, the fact that the relationship continues to be
positive – but insignificant – does not support the prior literature. The claim that left-wing
governments are more likely to give foreign aid, in other words, still looks very weak.
Along with Model 1, the coefficients for voting affinity are positive and statistically
significant in Models 3 and 4. This result, once again, supports the notion that U.S. influence is
extremely consequential in motivating IADB member states’ decisions, or, at least when trade

11

For the purpose of obtaining further results, I decided to estimate an alternative model based on an alternative
coding of middle powers. In this trial, I looked at the top 10 countries (throughout the time-series) in the world as
measured by total geographical area, military expenditures, and GDP. I excluded the U.S., and then coded the other
top nine. To be included, the country had to be in the top 10 in at least two of three categories. The alternative
coding yields these middle powers: Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and the
United Kingdom. It is loosely based on Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel’s (1970) conceptualization. Using this
alternative coding, the results are fairly consistent with the prior models. The coefficient for the log of trade remains
positive and statistically significant (p<.001). Also, the coefficient for the interaction term between trade and middle
powers is negative (again, yielding an unanticipated effect) and statistically significant (p<.001). Finally, similar to
Model 1, yet different from the other three models, the coefficient for middle powers is negative (meaning that
middle powers actually see a lower growth in subscription shares compared to lesser power states) and statistically
significant (p<.001). The results were completely consistent with another trial where I included the top 20 countries
as middle powers, as measured by total geographical area, military expenditures, and GDP.
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amongst middle powers is not taken into its full consideration. Of course, this realist-based
claim runs contrary to my expectation of more autonomous state behavior located within the
context of liberalism.
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Table 5
Determinants of IADB Subscription Shares (Model 3, Baseline)

Covariate

Coefficient

P-Value

0.6197497

Panel-Corrected
Standard Error
0.019634

Trade (log)
Political Orientation

0.0177665

0.0278695

0.524

Voting Affinity

1.629769

0.4960839

0.001

Middle Power

0.6169373

0.0893699

0.000

Regional Borrower

2.133811

0.1509652

0.000

Constant

-1.051839

0.2311878

0.000

Number Observations

699

R-Square

0.5181

Wald Chi-Square

6274.38

0.000

0.0000

Note: Dependent variable is log of subscription shares.
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Table 6
Determinants of IADB Subscription Shares with Interaction Term (Model 4)

Covariate

Coefficient

P-Value

0.639321

Panel-Corrected
Standard Error
0.024523

Trade (log)
Political Orientation

0.0248818

0.030588

0.416

Voting Affinity

1.605489

0.4946074

0.001

Middle Power

1.149433

0.245078

0.000

Regional Borrower

2.141063

0.1490143

0.000

Trade and Middle
Power Interaction
Term
Constant

-0.0577692

0.0312587

0.065

-1.222853

0.2230037

0.000

Number Observations

699

R-Square

0.5186

Wald Chi-Square

7889.65

0.000

0.0000

Note: Dependent variable is log of subscription shares.

67

The middle power and regional borrower dummy coefficients are both statistically
significant and in the positive direction in Models 3 and 4. As stated previously, I do not
anticipate being a middle power or developing country as having any overbearing impact on the
total amount of capital subscription shares. Rather, an increase or decrease in trade among
middle powers and the region should be associated with the total amount that each middle power
state contributes to the IADB. Either way, while the former result (middle power membership)
is congruent with that of Model 2, the latter result (regional borrower status) has yet to show any
sign of statistical significance.
It does make sense as to why this occurrence might actually be possible. If those
members which are able (versus those that cannot) to receive funds witness an increase in trade
in the Latin America and Caribbean region, then they may be more likely to raise their amount of
capital subscriptions. However, since I believe that all member states are receiving net benefits
from such disbursements, it is surprising to see statistical significance here. Given the results of
Models 1 and 2, though, I think this outcome is highly questionable.
I use a question to expand upon this argument a bit further. What might explain the
positive and statistically significant relationship between regional borrowers and capital
subscriptions in these trials? Because borrowers are being directly funded by the IADB, it only
makes sense to increase the amount of benefits they can potentially receive. However, as also
stated above, this result runs counter to my expectation. If non-regional borrowing members are
equally gaining (via trade) from their capital subscription shares, then it appears that they too
have much incentive to accrue the level of contributions.
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Discussion
As demonstrated in all four models, the coefficients for trade are on par with
expectations. Each coefficient is statistically significant and in the positive direction. This
finding helps to support the liberal argument that IADB member states make decisions (i.e.
raising or lowering subscription shares) in response to their own enlightened self-interest (mutual
gains) rather than being mandated through U.S. hegemony. However, when the interaction
between middle powers and trade is considered, the coefficient becomes negative. This
occurrence suggests that the liberal argument might need to be modified. Otherwise, why would
capital subscription shares decrease as trade in Latin America and the Caribbean goes up? I seek
to provide further answers to this dilemma.
Staying within the context of foreign aid, one reasonable explanation as to why middle
powers may decrease their IADB capital subscriptions when trade goes up is that Latin America
and Caribbean countries are receiving additional funding from alternate lending sources. For
instance, perhaps these states have been relying more on IFIs such as the World Bank and IMF.
Alternatively, Latin American states may continue to absorb sufficient funds from other RDBs
and sub-regional development banks (SRDBs) such as the Development Bank of Latin America
(CAF), the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), the Caribbean
Development Bank (CDB), FONPLATA Development Bank, and so forth. It could be that such
Latin America and Caribbean states have become more inclined to private based (banks and
credit agencies) lending institutions. Even further, maybe many of these middle power countries
have increased the level of their bilateral assistance and, therefore, do not need to overinvest in
multilateral spending arrangements. The point here is rather simple. Being that the IADB does
not serve as the only lending tool within the Latin America and Caribbean region, it might live to
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complement these other organizations. As a result, if funding gaps are being filled from other
bilateral and multilateral aid programs, then IADB middle power subscriptions could be
declining because aggregate development inflows are on the rise.
A somewhat similar, yet distinct, liberal explanation is associated with the notion of
humanitarianism. That is, perhaps the reason these middle power states decrease growth in their
capital subscription shares when trade goes up is because they feel that trade is more effective in
promoting development and reducing poverty. The claim here, in other words, is that increases
in middle powers’ trade with the region reduces poverty in recipient countries. Individual
country subscriptions, thus, do not have as much demand as they would if poverty were to go up
when trade goes down. This argument falls directly in line with those put forth by humanitarian
scholars such as David Lumsdaine (1993), as can be seen in his renowned book, Moral Vision in
International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989. Donor states tend to respond to
needy and socioeconomically repressed recipients. State preferences, in this sense, linger around
the notion of poverty reduction or eradication. Although this sentiment represents a somewhat
different version of liberalism, it is committed to the liberal ideals set forth in the literature and
this dissertation nonetheless.
The third explanation is based on the same liberal concept (i.e. trade as the driver of
development) as humanitarianism, but with a different narrative. This idea is based on a tradenot-aid type ordeal. From this angle, it might be said that middle power states decrease their
capital subscriptions when trade rises because they do not want to be overburdened by excessive
debt. Trade within itself, technically speaking, serves as the means of development. Because
economic growth is being triggered by the more natural monetary inflows of trade, foreign
assistance does not meet demand. The potential benefits of multilateral aid, in this sense, are not
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enough for middle powers to pursue a debt-ridden path. This level of reasoning can be directly
attached to scholars like Erik Lundsgaarde, Christian Breunig, and Aseem Prakash (2007), as is
elicited in their novel work, “Trade versus Aid: Donor Generosity in an Era of Globalization.”
Onerous aid intakes are liable to create dependency. The more contingent that recipient
governments become on donors’ assistance, the more likely they are to build up burdensome
foreign aid receipts. This type of recipient commitment, thus, may actually perform as a catalyst
against development. Despite such a difference in strategy, state preferences continue to be
defined by the absorption of wealth and poverty reduction.
The coefficient for political orientation is positive across all four models, but the effect is
statistically significant in only two models. This reality suggests that conservative governments
could be more important and, therefore, driving the allotment of subscription shares rather than
trade alone. Again, this depicted scenario would seem to indicate that the liberal argument is
weak. However, as mentioned numerous times in the results section, the fact that two of the
models depict statistical insignificance makes this outcome flimsy at best. Yet, for the sake of
explanation and interpretation, I will offer an analysis of why this positive relationship can
possibly be viewed from a liberal standpoint.
As found within the literature, one of the core precepts of liberalism is state preferences
that take the shape of competing domestic pressure groups. That is, state governments pursue
the interests of those groups which they represent. Since right-wing governments are usually
more likely to represent the business elite (i.e. MNCs), it makes sense as to why member states’
subscription shares accrue when such entities are in office. With this being the case, MNCs and
other big business ventures often serve as the greatest beneficiaries of such developmental

71

assistance. Whether it be through FDI-led contracts, stock portfolios, or comparative advantage
at home, these capitalist elites typically reap the direct economic rewards of overseas investment.
As argued throughout much of this dissertation, my expectation is that there would be no
statistically significant relationship between political orientation and capital subscription shares.
The reason being is that leftist and centrist governments also have much to gain from multilateral
development assistance. That is, as trade and profit increases, more jobs are created. Of course,
this type of upswing means that thousands of people will be lifted out of poverty. This line of
logic, hence, is exactly why it appears that further trade and capital subscription shares would
perform as a universal phenomenon across all domestic social groups. It is for this reason that I
continue to point out the statistical insignificance of two models and overemphasize the volatility
of such a relationship.
With the voting affinity coefficient being statistically significant in three of the four and
positive in all four models, it appears that IADB member states are being heavily swayed by U.S.
influence. Such states, in other words, seem to be voting more accordingly (whether it be within
the UNGA or IADB) with hegemonic interests across their respected IOs altogether. This
actuality supposedly provides partial support for a structural realist theory that can complement a
liberal approach. Again, it should be recalled that the result for voting affinity in Model 2 does
indeed show statistical insignificance and, thus, sheds some doubt on the validity of such
findings. However, some discussion of the findings is warranted, and, therefore, in the next two
paragraphs I will offer a couple of different perspectives that might help to support the liberal
argument a bit further.
On one account, it is difficult to say in which direction the U.S. is voting within the
IADB, as the U.S. does not publish its voting records. The point here is rather simple. Just
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because IADB member states decide to increase their total subscription shares when UNGA
voting affinity scores go up, it does not tell us anything definitive about IADB voting decisions
more generally. For instance, the U.S. may actually be asking member countries to lower their
capital subscription shares, but to no avail. The superpower, technically speaking, does not have
this kind (although still possessing veto power in other areas) of effective veto power in the
IADB. As long as member states domestically approve higher allotments and present this
information to the Board of Governors within a timely manner, the latter body is almost
guaranteed to grant their request. Further, given the relative power dynamic (U.S. having
roughly one-third of votes and needing less coalitional support), it is not easy to decipher voting
outcomes. The U.S. might actually be getting limited support (but enough to pass) for its desired
policies, but member states, theoretically speaking, could be voting counter to U.S. interests with
the latter still being endorsed nonetheless.
The other point to be made here in support of a liberal interpretation of voting affinity is
the notion of state preferences. Member states could very well be voting and acting accordingly
to U.S. interests. However, their line of reasoning might simply be that such decisions are
directly reflective of what these countries want for themselves. For instance, if member states in
the IADB believe that a multibillion-dollar infrastructure project in Brazil will align with their
own economic prospects (along with U.S. interests), then they are likely to vote consensually. In
addition, perhaps aligning their votes in the IADB with the U.S. facilitates greater trade between
donor economies and the U.S. (if the U.S. reciprocates for cooperation in IOs with trade). So,
just because most of these countries display higher voting affinity scores across the UNGA does
not indicate that they are being dictated to in the IADB. Even within the former IO, member
states are probably voting in agreement with their own policy desires. These individual choices
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(albeit from a mere self-interested standpoint) happen to be the same as those of the U.S. and,
therefore, move the affinity scores.
As stated previously, the middle power coefficient is statistically significant across all
four models. However, the direction of the relationship is not consistent. Model 1 shows a
negative relationship12, suggesting that capital subscription shares are actually more likely to
decline among middle powers compared to other donors. By contrast, Models 2, 3, and 4 tell a
completely different story. Given the positive direction of their coefficients, these models
indicate that middle powers are most apt to increase the aggregate level, and change of
subscriptions. Due to such ambiguous results, it is hard to overemphasize the statistical
significance of any of them. No matter, I will provide details below as to why I believe that
either case could fit easily into the liberal theoretical framework.
In terms of middle powers being the states that are most likely to raise their capital
subscriptions, I think a couple of potential explanations are at hand. First, these states have
bigger budgets than developing states, and they may invest heavily in foreign aid expenditures to
increase their share of absolute gains. The second reason is associated with debt burdening.
Because middle power states are often host to regions that remain significantly underdeveloped,
they (at least those who are eligible to borrow) might be more willing (as a result of having much
larger economies) to take on heavier lending risks. In turn, donors are willing (thanks to growing

12

Regarding the negative relationship, it could very well be that developing states have more incentive to raise their
total subscriptions. Since these countries are usually the most destitute, they have larger gaps that need to be filled.
If trade (business profit) is going up and jobs are being created, then these weaker states might want to continue
pressing down on the accelerator in order to maximize (for both the wealthy and poor) their net utility. Another way
of looking at this scenario is through the poverty lens. As discussed earlier, the humanitarian liberal argument
would claim that state preferences are strictly motivated by poverty reduction. So, the more socioeconomically
debilitated a country is the more apt its government will be to increase the aggregate level of multilateral aid.
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and dependable economies) to grant this request under the premise of aid-follows-trade. Neither
of these claims, once again, are incompatible with liberalism.
Finally, the coefficient for regional borrowers is statistically significant and in the
positive direction in Models 3 and 4. These results suggests that there is a much higher tendency
for IADB borrowing members to increase their subscription shares relative to non-borrowing
states. By contrast, Models 1 and 2 are both statistically insignificant and in the negative
direction, which shows that the percentage change (log) is lower. Despite such statistical
insignificance, the indication here is that non-borrowing members are actually the ones to
demonstrate a better likelihood of raising their total subscriptions. With such drastically
different findings, the relationship must be considered inconsistent and unreliable. For the sake
of clarifying the argument, I will provide an analysis of how each argument could blend within
the liberal theoretical framework.
There are a couple of possible explanations as to why regional borrowing states are more
apt to increase their level of capital subscriptions. On the one hand, it is a simple matter of being
the direct beneficiaries of IADB funding. Since these countries, in other words, are the ones that
actually receive such multilateral assistance, it only makes sense for them to seek out further
financial aid. If project-level investment has a positively consequential effect on health,
education, wealth, and so forth, then borrowing members have a rational incentive to push
forward by heightening the amount of capital subscriptions. The following reason that I mention
deals with interdependence. Because Latin America and Caribbean countries are more
economically intertwined with one another, it is understandable why they would want to see
additional funding at hand. For instance, trade between Austria and Argentina is not nearly to
the extent of Brazil and Argentina. With the former trade arrangement having significantly less
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meaning versus the latter, the motive to raise IADB expenditures is inferior. State preferences,
under each of the circumstances listed here, remain committed to rationally induced self-interest.
In this case, liberalism should not be undermined in favor of realist advancement.
As stated above, despite the fact that the regional borrower coefficients are insignificant
in Models 1 and 2, non-borrowing members, nonetheless, are shown to have greater tendencies
to increase subscriptions. I put forth two explanations for this phenomenon as well. One reason
falls in line with the previously stated budgetary argument. Non-borrowing states (which are
developed) typically have larger budgets than their borrowing counterparts, and they can more
easily afford rapid growth in subscriptions. Again, it is not to say that borrowing members lack
the means to an end. Just from a relative standpoint, they have smaller availability. The other
possible explanation for this matter deals with interdependence. Even if it is just small
increments of increased trade, non-borrowing states might welcome this scenario as it provides
them with a stronger motive to increase their capital subscription commitments. This type of
interdependence, thus, helps to foster an avenue of cooperation that can be financially rewarding
for non-borrowing members. For instance, a country like South Korea might begin to receive
more openness to investment (i.e. MNCs) from Peru as they become further engaged with one
another. Once again, given the evidence at hand, it appears very difficult to undermine the
liberal argument.

Conclusion
The overall relationship between trade and capital subscriptions presented in the models
appears to be consistent with expectations. The findings across all four models support the
liberal argument. However, when considering the interactive effect amongst middle powers and
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trade, a different (negative coefficient) result comes into light. Since these middle power states
actually decrease their level of subscriptions as trade goes up in the Latin America and
Caribbean region, liberalism does not seemingly provide complete understanding for the
behavior of middle powers. Given my critical assessments in the analysis section, I hope that
some light has been shed onto why liberalism can still explain and predict state behavior at the
international level using a more general perspective.
Although circumstances (e.g. the total disbursement of lending institutions) may change,
state preferences often stay on a steady course. That is, as long as trade continues to foster
wealth and create jobs, states will actively pursue paths toward absolute gain. The indication
here is rather simple. If states are steadily increasing their win sets from global trade, then I
anticipate they will find sufficient ways to maximize utility via external funding. When the
situation is reversed, they will likely look to decrease the aggregate lending amount within many
of their sources of foreign aid. Theoretically speaking, and perhaps the most important point to
be made, is that overall spending can decline in some financial (whether this be bilateral or
multilateral) arrangements while rising in others. As a result, just because middle powers might
lower their capital subscriptions in the IADB when Latin America and Caribbean trade is on an
incline, this does not mean that they are not using other channels of distribution to promote
further trade.
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Chapter 6

Conclusion

Overview of Central Argument, Results, and Analysis
I start this conclusion by reevaluating the research agenda at hand. First, it would be
prudent to reiterate the central thesis of this dissertation. My argument can be summarized in the
following way. As overall trade increases between middle powers and countries in the Latin
America and Caribbean region, I expect middle power states to increase their capital subscription
shares in the IADB. The foundation of this argument is centered on liberal theory. Because
states, in this case middle powers, are able to mutually benefit from international trade, it is in
their immediate interest to pursue this globalized strategy. In other words, trade will help to
enhance maximum utility. The reason for this expectation is that trade increases wealth and
creates jobs, and consequently, many within the general populace are lifted from poverty. In
addition, multinational firms and other big business conglomerates typically reap the financial
rewards (using the adage of “the rich get richer”) of these accruing monetary inflows. Most
social groups, in this sense, serve as beneficiaries of international trade. State preferences (via
domestic pressure groups), thus, are likely to assume the form and support open trade policies.
As each of the models show in the results section, the relationship between trade and
IADB capital subscriptions is statistically significant in the positive direction. These findings
suggest that there is much support behind the validity of my research argument, but only for all
donors to the IADB. However, the interaction term between middle powers and trade in Models
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2 and 4 tells a very different story. With a significant and negative coefficient, the interaction
term shows that the change in capital subscriptions actually declines when middle power trade
increases with Latin America and the Caribbean. These findings reveal that there might be some
limitations to my argument. Liberalism, in other words, is put to a staunch theoretical challenge.
In the discussion section of Chapter 5, I highlighted many potential explanations in
response to these results. Of course, the intention was to demonstrate how liberalism can still be
applied to the argument at hand. As already discussed, liberalism does not exist in a vacuum.
There are various perspectives and strategies associated with its meaning. While state
preferences may oftentimes remain the same, they can be pursued in many different ways,
shapes, and forms. Let me reaffirm my position by briefly touching upon this reasoning again.
Staying within the context of foreign aid, one reasonable explanation as to why middle
powers may decrease their IADB capital subscriptions when trade goes up is that Latin America
and Caribbean countries are receiving additional funding from alternate lending sources. For
instance, perhaps these states have been relying more on IFIs such as the World Bank and IMF.
Alternatively, Latin American states may continue to absorb sufficient funds from other RDBs
and SRDBs such as the CAF, the CABEI, the CDB, FONPLATA Development Bank, and so
forth. It could be that such Latin America and Caribbean states have become more inclined to
private based (banks and credit agencies) lending institutions. Even further, maybe many of
these middle power countries have increased the level of their bilateral assistance and, therefore,
do not need to overinvest in multilateral spending arrangements. The point here is rather simple.
Being that the IADB does not serve as the only lending tool within the Latin America and
Caribbean region, it might live to complement these other organizations. As a result, if funding
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gaps are being filled from other bilateral and multilateral aid programs, then IADB middle power
subscriptions could be declining because aggregate development inflows are on the rise.
A somewhat similar, yet distinct, liberal explanation is associated with the notion of
humanitarianism. That is, perhaps the reason these middle power states decrease growth in their
capital subscription shares when trade goes up is because they feel that trade is more effective in
promoting development and reducing poverty. The claim here, in other words, is that increases
in middle powers’ trade with the region reduces poverty in recipient countries. Individual
country subscriptions, thus, do not have as much demand as they would if poverty were to go up
when trade goes down. This argument falls directly in line with those put forth by humanitarian
scholars such as David Lumsdaine (1993), as can be seen in his renowned book, Moral Vision in
International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989. Donor states tend to respond to
needy and socioeconomically repressed recipients (on the case of Japan and humanitarianism,
see Tuman, Strand, and Emmert, 2009). State preferences, in this sense, linger around the notion
of poverty reduction or eradication. Although this sentiment represents a somewhat different
version of liberalism, it is committed to the liberal ideals set forth in the literature and this
dissertation nonetheless.
The third explanation is based on the same liberal concept (i.e. trade as the driver of
development) as humanitarianism, but with a different narrative. This idea is based on a tradenot-aid type ordeal. From this angle, it might be said that middle power states decrease their
capital subscriptions when trade rises because they do not want to be overburdened by excessive
debt. Trade within itself, technically speaking, serves as the means of development. Because
economic growth is being triggered by the more natural monetary inflows of trade, foreign
assistance does not meet demand. The potential benefits of multilateral aid, in this sense, are not
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enough for middle powers to pursue a debt-ridden path. This level of reasoning can be directly
attached to scholars like Erik Lundsgaarde, Christian Breunig, and Aseem Prakash (2007), as is
elicited in their novel work, “Trade versus Aid: Donor Generosity in an Era of Globalization.”
Onerous aid intakes are liable to create dependency. The more contingent that recipient
governments become on donors’ assistance, the more likely they are to build up burdensome
foreign aid receipts. This type of recipient commitment, thus, may actually perform as a catalyst
against development. Despite such a difference in strategy, state preferences continue to be
defined by the absorption of wealth and poverty reduction.

Liberalism in Relation to Lesser and Middle Powers as Unit of Analysis
With this being said, and as can be witnessed throughout this dissertation, the liberal
framework is not limited to middle powers alone. Even weaker, developing countries are
expected to behave in ways that foster their own net utility (i.e. project-led developments that
enhance trade or wealth) benefits. In fact, Model 1 actually exhibits a statistically significant
negative coefficient between middle powers and capital subscriptions. This finding suggests that
lesser powers are more likely than middle powers to see a percentage change increase in the log
of their subscription shares as trade goes up in the Latin America and Caribbean region. Given
the statistically significant and positive direction of this relationship in Models 2, 3, and 4, this
claim is highly doubtful. Nonetheless, one may be left to wonder as to why middle powers were
selected as the unit of analysis. In what follow, I recapitulate my position on this issue.
The primary reason that I implement this approach is to challenge the conventional
wisdom of realist thought. In a globalized world that is still defined by many (particularly
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realists) as a cornerstone for power politics, it seems only necessary to dissect the truer intentions
of those states that are able to challenge (or support) the existing hierarchy and rule of the
international system. Being that such supposed challengers are typically classified as middle or
emerging powers, it makes sense to scrutinize them above all else. Lesser power states, in other
words, do not possess the material capabilities to pose any significant or direct threat to US
hegemony. I have made it a point, nonetheless, to incorporate lesser powers into my analysis
anyways. My basis for this approach is simple. If both middle and lesser powers demonstrate
tendencies to increase RDB capital subscriptions as their overall level of trade accrues in the
given region, then it can be inferred that each member state is satisfactorily living under the
neoliberal umbrella. This brand of reasoning would also help explain why lesser powers
continue to agree raising their aggregate number of subscriptions when they are often obliged to
sacrifice voting rights via middle power-led coalition blocs. When state preferences are
coherently aligned, the desired outcomes matter more than any procedural technique.

U.S. Influence in the IADB and Liberal Theory
One finding that deserves a bit more speculation is the result for voting affinity between
IADB donors and the U.S. in the UN General Assembly. In all four of the models, the
coefficients are positive. Additionally, three of the four models (with Model 2 barely falling
short) show statistical significance. With this being said, let me reassert my reasoning as to why
I believe realist-based arguments are insufficient for interpreting this outcome.
On one account, it is difficult to say in which direction the U.S. is voting within the
IADB, as the U.S. does not publish its voting records. The point here is rather simple. Just
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because IADB member states decide to increase their total subscription shares when UNGA
voting affinity scores go up, it does not tell us anything definitive about IADB voting decisions
more generally. For instance, the U.S. may actually be asking member countries to lower their
capital subscription shares, but to no avail. The superpower, technically speaking, does not have
this kind (although still possessing veto power in other areas) of effective veto power in the
IADB. As long as member states domestically approve higher allotments and present this
information to the Board of Governors within a timely manner, the latter body is almost
guaranteed to grant their request. Further, given the relative power dynamic (U.S. having
roughly one-third of votes and needing less coalitional support), it is not easy to decipher voting
outcomes. The U.S. might actually be getting limited support (but enough to pass) for its desired
policies, but member states, theoretically speaking, could be voting counter to U.S. interests with
the latter still being endorsed nonetheless.
The other point to be made here in support of a liberal interpretation of voting affinity is
the notion of state preferences. Member states could very well be voting and acting accordingly
to U.S. interests. However, their line of reasoning might simply be that such decisions are
directly reflective of what these countries want for themselves. For instance, if member states in
the IADB believe that a multibillion-dollar infrastructure project in Brazil will align with their
own economic prospects (along with U.S. interests), then they are likely to vote consensually. In
addition, perhaps aligning their votes in the IADB with the U.S. facilitates greater trade between
donor economies and the U.S. (if the U.S. reciprocates for cooperation in IOs with trade). So,
just because most of these countries display higher voting affinity scores across the UNGA does
not indicate that they are being dictated to in the IADB. Even within the former IO, member
states are probably voting in agreement with their own policy desires. These individual choices
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(albeit from a mere self-interested standpoint) happen to be the same as those of the U.S. and,
therefore, move the affinity scores.

Perspectives on Structural Realism
Now that I have demonstrated how liberalism is applicable to state behavior in IOs and
the international arena more generally, my next step is geared toward eliciting the theoretical
relevance of structural realism. To begin, the arrival of new IOs and international associations
such as the AIIB, BRICS, and the BRICS-led NDB has certainly caused the U.S. to become
increasingly wary of the motives and agenda of China, Russia, Brazil, India, and South Africa.
The hegemon, in other words, has seemingly grown most concerned with these emerging powers
acting as potential revisionary rather than status quo states. In this sense, it can be said that
middle powers may very well use IOs to promote realist-based efforts of balancing and the
spoiler effect. With no clear-cut evidence to reject this claim, it would be foolish to wholly
discount the visibility of structural realism.
Turning to an internal dynamic perspective, the rules of engagement are not universal
across IOs. For instance, the WTO is defined by the principle of “one country, one vote.” When
looking at the relative voting power within RDBs, the U.S. has way more weighted influence in
some (e.g. IADB) versus others (e.g. AfDB). Then, if we consider how an IFI like the World
Bank includes an abundance (which is limited in the IADB) of effective veto mechanisms, along
with the relative voting power found within the IADB, the presence of structural realism
becomes most apparent. That is, as the U.S. displays its vast modes of influence in an IO such as
the World Bank, the latter organization’s existence does appear to be epiphenomenal. The point
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to be made here is that while some IOs and, therefore, international behavior, may be guided by
liberal ideals and mechanisms, others are more likely steered by a structural realist agenda.

Conclusion: Limitations and Suggestions for further Research
It is also important to note some of the limitations of this dissertation. First, one could
argue that the main finding for trade fits better into a structural realist framework. Just because
there is a positive relationship between trade and percentage change in capital subscriptions, it
does not automatically imply that liberal-based state preferences are the central motive. Realist
notions such as balancing and the spoiler effect, in other words, could be more readily at play.
Another limitation deals with external validity. Being that this study focuses on only one
regional developmental or lending institution, it is difficult to know whether the findings can be
generalized to a broader effect of (whether this be regional or global) trade. It, therefore, would
be helpful to see how middle powers navigate their decisions and behavior in other RDBs and
IFIs. This research strategy could open up an avenue for making more concrete and wider
generalizations. A third limitation is centered on internal validity. From this perspective, it can
be argued that certain controls are missing and, hence, contribute to a diagnostic issue of omitted
variable bias. For instance, the insertion of more structural and economic variables like the year
of a General Capital Increase meeting and the onset of economic crisis could help to fulfill any
variance that is lacking within the models. The final limitation is that due to data limitations, the
time-series for this study was limited to 2004 through 2018. As suggested in Chapter 4, there
was sufficient variation in the data to test the central hypotheses in this dissertation. However, it
is possible that a study of a longer time period (that covered the years of the Cold War) would
yield different results. Certainly, this is an avenue for future research.
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Next, I aim to provide a brief, yet thorough, account of the value that this research can
bring to future scholarship. Whether it be academics, governments, or foreign policy analysts,
they may all benefit from the theoretical underpinning set forth in this dissertation. Again, this is
not to say that liberalism acts as a universal predictor for state behavior in general. As I have
previously discussed, many other IR theories can find explanatory relevance across the current
international arena. The liberal argument set forth here, thus, is intended to provide additional
(both complementary and competing) perspective in regard to middle powers’ motives and
international behavior. Let me reassert once more exactly what the implications are behind such
a liberal framework.
Since my argument is based on the theoretical concept of liberalism and, therefore, that
state preferences take shape around the current neoliberal world order, I believe that middle
power states do not aim or wish to revise the status quo. With this being said, these states are
more than happy dwelling through the guidance of hegemonic stability. Mutual, instead of
relative, gains hold highest precedence amongst such potentially competing entities. Middle
powers are supportive of this arrangement, in part, because multinational firms from all
economic sectors across various countries are most influential as they receive the net benefits of
this contemporary global system. I do not think they will be willing to risk the overall value of
these monetary rewards for the sake of minute or redundant revisionary alterations.
Piggybacking on this assessment, I want to relate it to the current international questions
that arise today. Middle/emerging powers like China, Russia, India, Brazil, and so forth should
not be viewed as imminent threats to Western neoliberalism or U.S. hegemony. They merely
seek to complement rather than overturn the status quo. International associations and IOs like
BRICS, SCO, and AIIB, thus, ought to be welcomed with open arms. These organizational
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bodies can fill both development and security (counterterrorism) voids that have become
incessantly prevalent across the world.
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